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This dissertation contributes to our knowledge about water markets by 
analyzing the factors that explain market transactions of water rights when there is 
also a spot market for water volumes.  I hypothesize that risk heterogeneity among 
farmers can explain those transactions.  To test the aforementioned hypothesis I 
model farmers’ decisions on investment in water rights each season under the 
assumptions that they face output risk and that uncertainty is generated by future 
water availability and price.  The first order condition to this problem, which is 
represented by the Euler Equation, indicates that the current period reservation value 
of a water right depends on the current value of the amount of water accorded to 
water rights in the spot market, the stochastic discount factor, and the expected future 
prices of water rights.  Using the relationship between the reservation value of a water 
right and the stochastic discount factor I show analytically how heterogeneous 
  
 
preferences are a sufficient condition for an active market for water rights.  Then, I 
test for heterogeneous preferences by allowing them to be a function of specific 
characteristics of farmers.  That requires the estimation of a system of equations that 
includes a parametric specification of the Euler Equation and the first order 
conditions for optimal input quantities.  For that, I use an exponential utility function 
and a production function of the Just-Pope type.  I jointly estimate the parameters that 
describe a farmer’s utility function along with production function parameters.  The 
empirical application uses farmer micro-level data from a two-round survey that I 
conducted on a sample of Limarí Basin farmers.  That Basin is located in the northern 
part of Chile and is characterized by an active water market that has existed since 
1981.  Evidence rejects the hypothesis of homogeneity among farmers and suggests 
that those better educated and more experienced Limarí Basin farmers are less risk-
averse.  Results also show that water, labor and fertilizers have a positive impact on 
mean output per hectare but their effect on yield variability implies that those inputs 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The study of water resources is a passionate task as their increasing value and 
unique characteristics are appealing for economists working on natural resources and 
have important implications for peoples’ well-being.  
Almost any paper or document that tackles water management will begin by 
pointing out that worldwide, even countries and regions where water is abundant face 
increasing water scarcity (Rosegrant et al., 1997, Tsur, 2004, Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  
Demands for water from all sectors – agriculture, industry, households, and even 
environmental conservation – combined with increasing difficulty in developing new 
structural solutions to increase water supply, explain growing water scarcity.  
Projections of water withdrawals by sectors show the dramatic increase in pressure on 
water resources over the next three decades (Rosegrant et al., 1997).  
Water has special characteristics because it is not a resource like others that 
can be easily appropriated, traded and used without affecting others.  Water is a 
mobile resource that generates multiple levels of physical inter-dependence among 
users, while farmers’ water use and transfer decisions create externalities.  Water 
diversion requires expensive devices for volumetric or flow measurements and costly 
conveyance systems.  Finally, water for irrigation is characterized by the randomness 
of supply and the high cost of reducing variability through storage capacity. 
Since the 1950s, the literature has debated the merits of water allocation 
institutions, and now wise water management policies are among the most crucial 
challenges of nearly all countries.  If Julian Simon – whom I met for the first time in 
1986 and who encouraged me to come to study at the University of Maryland – were 
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still alive, surely he would have seen this problem as a challenge for the people.  
Likely he would have said that this new challenge could best be resolved by allowing 
people to deal freely with this problem, as he extensively documented in his works on 
decreasing scarcity of several natural resources.  The public-good approach with 
public water ownership and state involvement in its development and distribution 
does not work well in the present context of water scarcity.  Thus, as Saleth and Dinar 
(2004) point out, “The current trend is toward an alternative system that can allow 
private decision-making in water resource development, allocation, and management.  
For the alternative system to function effectively and equitably, legal changes are 
needed to facilitate private and transferable water-rights system that ensures full legal, 
physical and tenure certainty of water rights.”   
Worldwide, irrigation continues to be, by far, the largest sector of water 
consumption accounting for nearly 70% of water withdrawals worldwide and over 
90% in low-income developing countries.  Another 23 percent of water is used in 
industry and the remainder is consumed by households.  These numbers indicate that 
the increasing demand for water will need to be met from water savings in irrigated 
agriculture by improving efficiency.  Traditionally, economists have argued that 
efficiency can be achieved through a water pricing system that reflects water scarcity.  
This approach has some problems.  First, water users have been able to use their 
political power to prevent major increases in water prices, especially for irrigation.  
Second, the water authority needs to define a mechanism to value water, which may 
differ from water users’ willingness to pay for water.  
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Given those problems, water markets are receiving increasing attention from 
policymakers in an attempt to improve the efficiency of water allocation.  Although, 
in spite this and the fact that numerous informal water markets have evolved around 
the world, very few countries have implemented formal and legal free markets for 
water.  This is a result in part from the difficulty that researchers face in studying 
rights that are attached to a mobile resource like water.  Therefore, relevant policy 
questions about water markets have not been addressed with empirical evidence.  
Moreover, policymakers have tended to claim state “ownership” of water and have 
been reluctant to develop tradable water rights by separating them from land rights, 
which would allow the transfer of the former.  They recognize the theoretical value of 
water market institutions, but some think that the number of recorded instances where 
water is reallocated by market transactions is far too limited due to physical 
constraints and third-party effects associated with water exchanges.  There are also 
doubts about whether the market can reallocate water to its optimal social use.  
Hence, still the main question about water markets, as Saliba (1987) pointed out is 
“Do water markets ‘work’?”  
Chile has formal water markets that have been operating for more than 24 
years, and has become, along with Australia, an example of how institutional reforms 
that treat water as an economic good improve water-use efficiency and water 
allocation.  Nonetheless, more empirical research based on extended data is required 
to support those hypotheses (Bauer, 2004).  Thus, Chilean water markets offer an 
excellent opportunity for researchers who seek to answer relevant policy questions 
about water markets. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of water 
right transactions.  I attempt to answer a basic question: What explains water rights 
trading when farmers can exchange water in the spot market, which has lower 
transaction costs?  In answering this question, I emphasize the link between the spot 
and water rights markets where differences in marginal returns to water among 
farmers are solved in the spot market while the water rights market address 
differences in the stochastic discount factor among farmers.  
In this dissertation, I develop a theoretical model in which I characterize 
optimal decision making by farmers faced with the decision of investment in water 
rights.  This model assumes that farmers face water and output uncertainty, and that 
they may trade water in the market for water rights and/or the spot market.  Because 
investment decisions affect future levels of consumption and farmers face 
uncertainty, the theoretical model for farmer decisions is modeled as a stochastic 
dynamic problem.  This results in a Consumption Capital Asset Price Model 
(CCAPM) whose solution is described by an Euler Equation that ties asset returns 
(water right returns in this case) to marginal rates of substitution of consumption at 
different points in time.  This model provides insights into how farmers determine 
their reservation value for water rights when it is considered an asset, often the main 
asset for farmers, and it allows me to emphasize the role of farmers’ heterogeneous 
risk preferences on their reservation values and on marketing activity.   
This theoretical analysis provides the foundation for a case study of water 
transfers for irrigation in the Limarí Basin, an important agricultural region in the 
northern part of Chile, which has one of the most active Chilean irrigation water 
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markets.  With farmer-level data obtained from a survey among farmers for two 
different agricultural seasons, the case study allows me to estimate jointly the 
parameters that describe a farmer’s utility function and production function.  The 
estimation is based on the Euler Equation and the first order conditions for input 
quantities.  Using observed economic behavior I test for heterogeneous preferences 
among farmers. The use of an asset price model to jointly determine farmers’ 
preferences and production technology in developing countries is a contribution to the 
literature on agricultural finance. 
The present analysis of a Chilean water market and its empirical application 
provide insights into how water markets work in a developing country.  It is hoped 
that the results of this dissertation will supplement our knowledge of the outcomes 
and experiences of developing countries with active, but undocumented, water 
markets, and help move the debate beyond principles to empirical results on the 
operation of water markets.  This analysis will serve countries that are contemplating 
adopting market-based reallocation systems where policymakers wish to inform 
themselves of other experiences in water markets in different cultures and geographic 
regions before they make a decision. 
This dissertation proceeds in 7 sections.  In Chapter 2, I present a brief survey 
of the literature on water markets.  I then proceed to provide a detailed description of 
the operation of the water market in the Limarí Basin.  In Chapter 4, I develop a 
theoretical model for optimal decision making by farmers who must decide on 
investment in water rights and input quantities in every season.  Data availability and 
the econometric model are discussed in Chapter 5.  In Chapter 6, I describe the 
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estimation procedures and I report estimation results.  Finally, Chapter 7 concludes 
with a summary of the main results and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter I review the relevant portions of the extensive literature on 
water management and water markets.  I also review the part of the literature on asset 
pricing models and the estimation of heterogeneous risk preferences that is related 
with the analysis and methodology of this dissertation.   
2.1 Water management 
There is a broad consensus in the literature on water management that 
increasing water scarcity requires a shift from supply-oriented approaches focused on 
technical and hydrological solutions towards allocation-oriented approaches centered 
on economic and institutional solutions that provide the right incentives for water 
savings.  These efforts focus primarily on agricultural irrigation, the main use of 
water all around the world1 (Saleth, 2004).  This is the starting point for a wide 
literature on alternative institutional arrangements to promote efficient use (Bruns and 
Meinzen-Dick, 2000, Saleth and Dinar, 2004)   
Since at least the 1950s, there has been a debate in the literature over socially 
appropriate water allocation institutions (for an excellent summary of that debate, see 
Lynne and Saarinen, 1993).  Traditionally, economists and policymakers have argued 
that what is needed is a centralized water pricing system2 that reflects the opportunity 
cost of water.  Centralized water pricing systems have two main problems.  First, 
water users have been able to use their political power to prevent major increases in 
                                                 
1 Irrigation is the largest sector of water consumption; accounting for nearly 70% of 
total water withdrawals worldwide and over 90% in low income developing countries. 
2 In such a system the water authority determines the value of water in different uses 
and fixes a price for the use of that resource. 
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water prices, especially for irrigation (Easter et al., 1998).  Second, under a 
centralized system of water pricing, the water authority needs to define a mechanism 
to value water, which may differ from water users’ willingness to pay for water.  
Non-market techniques to value water rights include the farm-budget residual 
valuation for water3 as in Hearne and Easter (1995 and 1997).  Another approach is to 
estimate the value of marginal productivity of water using a crop-water production 
function.  Marginal values of water in municipal uses or in instream and recreational 
uses are usually derived by estimating consumer willingness-to-pay through 
contingent valuation and travel cost methods.  Another procedure that has been used 
to evaluate willingness to pay for water is the least cost alternative technique as in 
Hearne and Easter (1995 and 1997)4.  Person and Michelsen (1994) offer a good 
review of different methods for estimating water values and they summarize the 
willingness to pay estimates for different water uses in studies until 1994.   
The current trend of water allocation institutions is toward an alternative 
system that allows private decision-making in water resource development, 
allocation, and management (Saleth and Dinar, 2004).  Thus, market-type allocation 
institutions such as water markets and water banks, that recognize water as an 
economic good rather than a social good, are receiving increasing policy attention in 
attempts to improve the efficiency of water allocation (Rosengrant and Binswanger, 
1994, Vermillion, 2000, Brookshire and Ganderton, 2004).  In that framework, the 
                                                 
3 In the residual method, subtracting all non water and land input cost from the total 
revenue yields a residual value, which can be viewed as the maximum price that the operator 
could pay for land and water and still break even.  The researcher then allocates the residual 
value between the two components, land and water. 
4 In this case, the technique is used to compare the present value of the cost of buying 
water rights against the cost of building a new storage capacity to increase water availability 
for municipal uses. 
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market provides the mechanism by which water is valued.  This new paradigm has 
been promoted by the United Nations at the Rio Convention on Environment and 
Development in 1992 and by the World Bank (1993). 
The literature on the design of water markets within the variety of legal 
settings that exist around the world has focused on the distinction between formal and 
informal markets.  In the formal market a variety of transactions take place, such as 
the rental of water rights, water volume sales for a specific time period, and water 
entitlement transferences, whereas in the informal market only short term transactions 
are observed (Bjornlund, 2004).   
Formal water markets have been implemented in the western United States in 
Colorado (early 1960’s) and California (since 1982), and in Chile (since 1981), 
Australia (since 1983), South Africa (since 1998), New Zealand (since 1991) and 
Mexico (since 1994).  Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Nicaragua are among the countries 
that are discussing policy reforms oriented towards water markets (Bauer, 2004).   
Saleth (2004) and  Bruns and Meinzen-Dick (2000), advocate that for formal 
water markets to function effectively and equitably, legal changes are needed to 
ensure full legal, physical, and tenure certainty of water rights separated from rights 
to land.  The costs associated with these institutional changes necessary to move to 
market mechanisms explain in part the reduced number of countries that have formal 
markets (Coward, 2000).  Those costs have been addressed by McCann and Easter 
(2004), but as Saleth and Dinar (2004) point out, “A study of the full transaction cost 
associated with the change to an alternative water allocation mechanism has not been 
attempted to our knowledge.”   
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With regard to informal markets, those markets have been widely 
implemented in a number of countries such as India (Saleth 1998), Pakistan 
(Meinzen-Dick, 1998) and Jordan (Shatanawi and Orabi, 1994).  
Most critics of water markets argue that they do not work at all or that 
transactions are too few due to market failures, and that they are not compatible with 
integrated water resource management because they do not jointly solve critical 
economic, environmental and social issues (Bauer, 1995 and 2004, Crase et al., 2000 
and 2003, Gleeson, 2003).  Supporters emphasize the benefits of water markets and 
how these markets are actively working in various parts of the world (Rosengrant and 
Binswanger ,1994; Holden and Tobani ,1995; Briscoe, 1996) 
The emergence of water markets as allocation institutions has led economic 
analysis to focus on what type of market is likely to appear, how water prices may be 
formed, and whether water markets improve efficiency of use by reallocating water to 
its highest use value.   
Up to now, the description of how water markets function has focused 
primarily on developed regions including the Western States of the USA (Michelsen 
and Young, 1993, Israel and Lund, 1995, Susan  M Burke et al., 2004) and, more 
recently, Australia (Bjornlund and McKay, 2002,  Bjornlund, 2004, Crase et al., 
2004).  Attention is now shifting toward the developing regions of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America.  Examples of empirical research on Latin American countries are the 
works done for Chile by Rios and Quiroz (1995) and Bauer (1995 and 2004). 
Rosengrant and Binswanger (1994) describe markets in tradable water rights in Chile 
and Mexico.  A major contribution to the literature on the outcomes of water 
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negotiation is the book edited by Bruns and Meinzen-Dick (2000), which documents 
cases primarily from South Asia and Indonesia.  These cases show how negotiation is 
frequently used by water users, and the successful outcomes that have resulted from 
the process.  
Understanding the factors that determine water right prices and their variation 
has become important for establishing whether water markets reallocate water to its 
most efficient use.  Initial studies explain price formation as a result of a bargaining 
process between farmers for which the value of marginal product of water differs.  
Several studies use hedonic price function to estimate the value of water rights and 
the factors that influence prices of water rights and its fluctuations, such as water 
right characteristics, institutional constraints, physical transferability of water, 
bargaining power of sellers and buyers, and speculative behavior over water right 
prices (Colby et al., 1993, Person and Michelsen, 1994, Bjornlund and Mckay, 1998).  
Numerous authors have constructed the theoretical arguments that some type of 
market based trading mechanism would greatly increase the efficient use of water (for 
a good summary of the state of art on water markets see Brookshire and Ganderton, 
2004).  The basic argument is well established: water is a natural resource with 
varying value in different uses and with clearly defined social and political 
constraints.  In terms of applied research, qualitative analyses as well as increasingly 
sophisticated empirical studies have been published to verify whether water markets 
allocate water to its highest valued use.  To make this determination several studies 
simulate market performance (Saleth et al., 1991, Dinar and Latey, 1991, Tisdell et 
al., 2004, Dinar et al., 1998, Murphy et al., 2000).  Also, an increasing number of 
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studies provide empirical analysis for assessing water right market efficiency with 
data on existing water markets, mainly in some states in the USA (Brown et al., 1982, 
Saliva, 1987, Crouter, 1987, Michelsen, 1994, Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994, 
Brookshire at al., 2004) and Australia (Crase et al, 2000, Bjornlund ,2004).  For the 
case of developing countries such as Chile, Rios and Quiroz (1995) and Bauer (1995 
and 2004) provide qualitative analysis of water market performance whereas Hearne 
and Easter (1995 and 1997) provide quantitative analysis of water market efficiency.  
A good number of these studies analyze whether water allocated through the market 
moves from its lower to its highest value by empirically identifying who are the 
buyers and the sellers.  This is the case of Nieuwoudt and Armitage (2004), Bjornlund 
(2004) and Crase et al. (2004) for developed countries as South Africa and Australia, 
and Hadjigeorgalis (2000) and Zegarra (2002) for the water market in the Limarí 
Valley, Chile.  In general, studies that analyze water market efficiency conclude that 
the major benefits of the formal market are associated with a reallocation of water to 
1) more productive soils, 2) more efficient water users, 3) higher-value uses, and 4) 
new developments and the consolidation of water into larger more viable units. 
The work by Bjornlund (2004) is quite interesting because he measures and 
compares temporary trade with permanent trade in the Goulburn System and Murray 
System, Australia.  Bjornlund (2004) finds that the temporary market has by far the 
highest amount of traded water, and that the practice of using both markets has been 
widely adopted to shift an irrigator’s risk position and to manage increased supply 
uncertainty.  He also indicates that trade in water rights surged after farmers became 
familiar with water trading and aware of the potential benefits. This took around 7 
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years in the area he studied.  Finally, he presents evidence that shows how liquidity 
constraints cause farmers to participate as buyers in the temporary market because 
they cannot afford to buy water rights. Crase et al. (2004) found similar results for the 
water markets in the Murray Darling Basin of Australia.  In New South Wales 
permanent and temporary transactions took 10 years to be significant, with temporary 
transactions always much more important.  In Victoria’s water market trade in water 
rights surged after 7 or 8 years.  These results of Bjornlund and Crase et al. on the 
relative size of the temporary market with respect to the permanent market and on the 
time that the permanent market takes to become established are very similar to the 
ones that I obtain for the Limarí Basin, and which are reported in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. 
Nevertheless, there still exists a real need for more applied work on water 
markets.  Brookshire and Ganderton (2004) point out that “it is necessary to 
understand beyond theoretical considerations how well these alternative institutions 
perform from an empirical standpoint and what are some of the institutional design 
issues that remain” and that “It is also needed to move beyond the simple description 
of markets to identify the forces operating within those markets.” 
2.1.1 Water markets in Chile and the Chilean Limarí Basin 
Chile, together with Australia, has become one of the world’s leading 
examples of how institutional reforms that treat water as an economic good improve 
water use efficiency and water allocation.  Yet more empirical research based on 
extended data needs to be done to support those hypotheses.  Bauer (2004) points out 
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that “much of the discussion about Chilean water markets has been long on 
theoretical or ideological argument and short on reliable information”. 
The first real empirical study of water markets in Chile was done by Hearne 
and Easter (1995 and 1997), followed by Hadjigeorgalis (2000) and Zegarra (2002).  
All these studies examine the water market in the Limarí Basin.  Hearne and Easter 
(1995 and 1997) also analyze water markets in the adjacent Elqui Basin, and Cristi et 
al. (2003) also use that basin in their case study.  
The Limarí River Basin, in north central Chile, has attracted national and 
international attention through the 1990s and first half of the 2000s.  The Limarí 
River Basin is the one example that is widely agreed to have an active and successful 
agricultural water market, including both temporary and permanent sales, and even 
local real estate agents broker and facilitate water rights trading.  Hearne and Easter 
(1995 and 1997) estimate economic gains (net return to society) and financial gains 
(individual net benefits) from trade in that basin.  Economic gains correspond to the 
difference between the value of water to the buyer after a purchase and the value of 
water to seller before a sale minus transaction costs of the transfer.  Financial gains 
for a seller equal the sale price less both the value of water to the seller and the 
seller’s transaction cost, whereas for a buyer it is the difference between the value of 
water to the buyer and the sum of the buyer’s purchase price and transaction costs.  
They conclude that market transfers of water rights produce substantial economic and 
financial gains from trade in the Limarí Basin.    
While their results are interesting they do not consider key features of water 
used in irrigation that affect individual values for water rights, such as uncertainty 
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about water availability and future water prices, output uncertainty, and farmers’ 
attitudes towards risk.  They also do not consider that in the Limarí Basin there are 
two markets for water that coexist and interact: the market for water rights sales 
(permanent transactions or permanent water rights sales) and the spot market for 
water (short-term or temporary transactions).  As a consequence, they fail to 
recognize the relationship between the value of a water right and the price of water in 
the spot market.   
Hadjigeorgalis (2000) provides the first empirical analysis of actual trading 
outcomes in both spot and water rights markets in the Limarí Basin.  For the spot 
market, she measures the number of transactions, volumes sold, and the number of 
participants - separated by buyers and sellers - for the period 1994-1997.  She also 
analyzes price behavior for the 95/96 and 96/97 seasons, using field data for around 
332 farmers.  She concludes that there exists an active spot water market with prices 
highly sensitive to water scarcity, and that the facility to transfer water volumes 
between sectors has resulted in an equalization of water prices for water volumes 
between geographically segmented sectors.  With respect to market activity in the 
market for water rights she identifies the existence of physical constraints that prevent 
transferring rights between different reservoirs and institutional constraints that 
prevent trading rights that are stored within the same reservoir, but that have different 
legal locations (i.e. farmers with water rights in different Water User Associations)5.  
These constraints produce segmentation into local market sectors below the dams and 
this segmentation allows for water right price differences between local markets.  She 
                                                 
5 Cortés, M (1997) offers a lucid explanation of the legal constraints to water right 
trades in the Paloma System. 
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also presents the first formal, theoretical analyses of the impact of risk and 
uncertainty on water market trading and water decisions on the amount of water to be 
used in the production process6.  In her theoretical approach she allows for output 
price and spot market price uncertainty, water endowment uncertainty and capital 
production risk for farmers that produce perennial crops.  She presents formal 
expressions for reservation spot market prices and reservation values for water rights.  
The former are a function of the net value of the marginal product of water in 
irrigation, irrigation efficiency, risk aversion and uncertainty cost associated with 
selling and buying water volumes.  Reservation values for water rights – which she 
derives by emphasizing that water rights are an asset – are a function of the sum over 
time of the discounted per period net values of the marginal product of water in 
irrigation (benefits from water use in irrigation less the cost of holding water rights), 
irrigation efficiency, risk aversion, and uncertainty cost associated with stochastic 
water supplies.  For perennial crop producers, reservation value is also a function of 
the risk of future loss of their stock of perennial crops from a water supply shortfall.  
In the empirical application she analyzes market participation and the probability that 
a farmer participates in either the spot market or the water right market, and whether 
the farmer will buy or sell water volumes and/or water rights.  Among the 
explanatory variables, she includes risk aversion proxied by farmer’s wealth.  She 
shows that trades occur from farms with low irrigation efficiency to farms with high 
irrigation efficiency and that transaction costs in the spot market as well as in the 
                                                 
6 Howitt (1998) provides a first theoretical analysis of the impact of risk and 
uncertainty on water markets and water decisions in a case study for the existing water 
market in California. 
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market for water rights are minimal.  The main limitation of Hadjigeorgalis’s work is 
that, although in the theoretical model she clearly addresses the effect of risk and risk 
preferences in the farmers’ reservation value for a water right, in the empirical 
application that relationship vanishes and is replaced by a set of prior assumptions 
regarding what type of farmers are more or less risk averse.  Thus she cannot clearly 
show how risk affects farmers’ water trading decisions.  An empirical test of the 
relationship among farmers’ characteristics and risk aversion would have helped her 
to explain what she called unexpected results.  One of these unexpected results is that 
perennial crop producers are not exclusively buyers of water rights but appear 
consistently on both sides of the market.  An empirical estimation of heterogeneous 
risk preferences may show how differences in risk preferences explain differences in 
reservation values for water rights among perennial crop producers.  If such 
differences exist then it would explain why water right trades occur as more risk-
averse perennial crop producers would buy water rights from those perennial crop 
producers with lower risk aversion.  
Zegarra (2002) focuses his research on the operation of the spot market in the 
Limarí Valley in the face of an extremely negative shock: the severe drought of 
96/97.  He models farmers’ decisions about the amount of water to be used in 
production and the amount of water to be sold in the spot market.  Farmers reach 
equilibrium when the water’s marginal of value product equals the spot market price 
for water.  Thus, farmers decide not to grow crops in those seasons in which the water 
return for selling water in the spot market is greater than their expected income from 
production.  Farmers are risk neutral and with production functions characterized by a 
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minimum water requirement constraint, which results in a non-convexity of the 
production technology.  With production non-convexity one of the main assumptions 
for Pareto efficient allocation through market transactions is broken.  Heterogeneity 
among farmers is given by their crop mix and this heterogeneity makes spot markets 
work.  By simulating expected income in different scenarios he tests the hypotheses 
that the increasing presence of permanent crops creates demand rigidities that reduce 
the effectiveness of spot water markets.  He finds that as crops become more 
concentrated in permanent crops the spot market water prices exhibit a higher average 
value and a greater dispersion.  He also analyzes a farmer’s participation in the spot 
market, i.e. if a farmer trades in the spot market and if so whether he is a buyer a 
seller or both.  The main results from Zegarra are that the spot market for water 
solves differences in the marginal return of water among farmers, promoting the 
allocation of water from low value annual crops to high value permanent crops.  He 
finds that in the context of severe drought, the water market starts to be less effective 
in allocating the resource, with greater water price dispersion.  Unlike Hadjigeorgalis 
(2000), he concludes that water rights are heterogeneous with statistically significant 
differences in both the mean water per share and the standard deviation.  He suggests 
that there are low transaction costs in the spot market.  The main limitation of 
Zegarra’s work is that it does not take into account farmers’ risk aversion.  This 
omission weakens one of his main results: that the spot market price at which the 
supply of water volumes starts to be greater than zero is $30 pesos.  If farmers are risk 
averse his model overestimates that value because a risk-averse farmer will be willing 
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to sell his seasonal amount of water – and obtain a sure income – at a price lesser than 
his expected marginal return of water use in irrigation. 
From the above literature review, it is possible to infer some guidelines for 
economic water research.  1) There is a need to understand how well water markets 
perform and the forces operating within those markets from an empirical standpoint, 
especially in non developed countries.  2) There is a need to empirically estimate the 
impact of risk and uncertainty on water market trading and water decisions on the 
amount of water to be used in production.  In the process it is advisable to infer 
reservation values for water rights from a model that recognizes that water rights are 
one of the farmer’s main assets.  3) When a market for water rights and a spot market 
for water coexist there is a need to account for the link between the two markets in 
order to understand how spot prices affect water right prices over time.  It also needs 
to be emphasized that the spot market resolves differences in the marginal return of 
water while the market for water rights resolves differences in farmers’ reservation 
values for a water right.  The latter are due to farmers’ differences on risk of future 
loss on their stock of perennial crops from a water supply shortfall as well as 
heterogeneous risk preferences.  4) Finally, there is a need to move from institutional 
constraints that explain price differences in the market for water rights across sectors, 
to factors that explain differences in reservation values between farmers within the 
same Water Users Association.   
The present dissertation contributes to the literature on water markets by 
providing new insights on several issues.  It measures market activity and provides 
the first estimation of the size of the temporary water trades (spot market) in relation 
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to the permanent markets (water right trades) in the most active Chilean water market.  
The analysis shows that the volume of water traded on the spot market is several 
times greater than on the permanent market.  Contrary to what other researchers such 
as Hadjigeorgalis (2000) believe, it illustrates how the spot market is active not only 
during drought years but also in years with average water availability.  The theoretical 
model that I develop infers reservation values for a water right from an asset pricing 
model that assumes heterogeneous risk preferences among farmers, incomplete asset 
markets and uncertainty about output, future water availability and future water 
prices.  It also incorporates the interaction between the spot market and the market for 
water rights where the spot market mainly resolves differences in the marginal return 
to water and the market for water rights mainly resolves differences in the stochastic 
discount factor among farmers.  The model explains differences in reservation values 
between farmers within the same Water Users Association as a function of farmers’ 
risk preferences.  The empirical application estimates an asset price model for water 
rights and input demands that allows testing for heterogeneous risk preferences 
among farmers.  In addition, the effect of water on the mean and variance of yields is 
estimated using detailed farm data on output and input quantities for each crop.  This 
is an improvement from previous studies, such as Hearne and Easter (1995 and 1997) 
and Hadjigeorgalis (2000), that rely on standard crop budgets to proxy the marginal 
revenue of water use in irrigation.  The role of risk differences due to different types 
of crops or distance from the reservoirs is not included in this dissertation and it 
represents an important future extension of this work.  
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2.2 Asset pricing models 
In this dissertation I model water right reservation values using a capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM).  The empirical use of a CAPM requires choosing between the 
conventional consumption-based capital asset-pricing model (CCAPM) and a 
production-based capital asset-pricing model (PCAPM).  Next I briefly review some 
of the literature related to these approaches and some of the literature related to the 
different issues embedded in the use of an asset pricing model to value water rights.   
The CCAPM ties asset returns to marginal rates of substitution for 
consumption at different points in time and so must use a utility function defined on 
consumption over time.  Alternatively, the PCAPM emphasizes the linkages between 
asset returns and investment and production variables.  In it, production is used 
instead of consumption and so the production function is modeled instead of the 
utility function.  A production model is proposed by Cochrane (1991 and 1996), 
where asset returns are tied to marginal rates of transformation (the rate at which the 
firm can transform goods from date t to date t+1, i.e. the rate of return on 
investment).  Then he empirically tests the relationship between stock and investment 
returns in which the investment/capital ratio is a key variable.  Arroyo (1996) 
explains asset returns as a function of capital productivity and the adjustment cost of 
capital proxied by the investment/capital ratio.  Those who propose the use of 
PCAPM usually mention the mounting evidence against standard consumption-based 
models of asset returns.  The empirical evidence indicates that returns on equity seem 
to be too high to be consistent with observed consumption behavior unless investors 
are extremely risk averse: a risk aversion often too large to be credible (Arroyo, 1996, 
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Campbell et al., 1997).  Cochrane (1996) and Campbell et al. (1977) point out that the 
poor empirical performance of CCAPM in explaining asset returns may be due, 
among other reasons, to measurement error in aggregate consumption and/or because 
growth of aggregate consumption is very smooth.  Another source of criticism of the 
CCAPM arises from transactions costs, borrowing constraints and other market 
frictions that may invalidate the condition that discounted expected marginal utilities 
should be equilibrated across time, which is the heart of the consumption-based 
capital asset pricing model.  In spite of the potential advantages of PCAPM over 
CCAPM, as I explain in Chapter 4, Section 4.2., I have chosen a consumption-based 
model because it emphasizes the role that preferences over consumption have in the 
determination of the reservation value for water rights, and as Moschini and 
Hennessy (2001) point out “…one should keep in mind that farmers ultimately likely 
care about their consumption, itself the result of an intertemporal decision”.  In that 
same line, Cochrane (2005, Chapter 9.1: 157) points out that “…good economists are 
unhappy about a utility function that has wealth in it.  Few of us are like Disney’s 
Uncle Scrooge, who got pure enjoyment out of a daily swim in the coins in his vault. 
Wealth is only valuable because it gives us access to more consumption.  Utility 
functions should always be written over consumption.  One of the few real rules in 
economics to keep our theories from being vacuous is that ad “hoc utility functions” 
over other objects like wealth should eventually be defended as arising from a more 
fundamental desire for consumption or leisure.”  
In this dissertation the CCAPM is derived from farmers’ optimal decisions 
about investment in water rights in each season.  The optimality conditions of the 
 
 23  
model are described by Euler Equations.  Empirically, the Euler Equations are 
estimated together with the first order conditions for input quantities, using farm-level 
data. 
A number of requirements for high quality empirical production research in 
agriculture, or what Just (2000) calls guiding principles, are addressed by the way in 
which farmers’ decisions are modeled in this dissertation.  First, it deals with the need 
to focus on long run considerations of investment and cost adjustments, and the need 
to consider the role of serial correlation of farm income and the intertemporal 
dependence of farmers’ marginal utilities. I model intertemporal decisions on 
investment which emphasizes the long-run nature of farmers’ decisions.  Although I 
model farmers’ decisions assuming non-serial correlation of farmer’s consumption 
and a time-additively separable utility function over consumption, the model 
indirectly links consumption and utilities over different periods.  This link arises 
because in this model the optimal consumption path depends on the stock of water 
rights which is related both to present and past investment in water rights (Bossaerts, 
2002).  Second, I  identify risk preferences using an asset pricing model for water 
rights, which arises from farmers’ investment decisions that reflect the greatest 
consequences of risk on farmers’ decisions (Just, 2000, Just and Pope, 2003).  
Usually, the problem is that data on asset choices are very limited, thus the data on 
water right choices gathered for this dissertation provides an important piece of 
information to be able to build an asset pricing model for these rights and from there 
to analyze the effect of risk and risk preferences.  Third, I use data at the individual 
farmer level and I incorporate farmers’ heterogeneity, which helps to improve the 
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empirical quality of the CCAPM (Campbell et al., 1997, Heaton and Lucas, 1996, 
Constantinides and Duffie, 1996).  Studies that estimate Euler Equations or more 
general  first-order conditions with data at individual level include, among others, 
Zeldes ( 1989),  Langemeier and Patrick (1993) and  Phimister (1995), all of them in 
the context of testing for liquidity constraints in the permanent income/life cycle 
model for consumption.  Blundell et al. (1994) estimate an Euler Equation using 
micro data in order to estimate the parameters of household preferences that 
determine the allocation of goods within the period and over the life cycle.  Most 
models of asset pricing assume homogeneous preferences among individuals or, 
equivalently, the existence of a representative agent.  Allowing farmers to differ in 
their utility functions is a contribution to the empirical literature on asset pricing.  The 
assumption of heterogeneous preferences is also a sufficient condition for the 
occurrence of asset trading among individuals.  Niehaus, (2001) considers a simple 
economy, where only a riskless bond, shares of a stock and an option written on the 
stock are available in the financial market, and shows that differences in investors’ 
preferences have an impact on asset prices and the amount of trading in the market.  
He finds that the amount of trading and the price of the option grow with increasing 
divergence in risk aversion, and the agents with a higher degree of risk aversion sell 
shares and options and buy the riskless bond.  The agents with a lower degree of risk 
aversion take the opposite position: they buy shares and options and sell bonds.  This 
is the same approach that I use in my dissertation, where each farmer has one asset – 
a water right – and the following options: to sell the water right and buy a riskless 
asset (or just put the money in bank at a riskless interest rate), to take more risk by 
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selling the water right and buying water in the spot market for use in farming 
activities, or to keep the water right and use it in a risky farming activity.  These are 
the relevant contributions of my dissertation to the literature on the analysis of 
farmers’ behavior along time, subject to limitations associated with the extent of the 
data which is at the farmer level for two agricultural seasons. 
2.3 Identifying risk preferences 
The inclusion of heterogeneous risk preferences in the CCAPM requires 
attention to the literature on identifying risk preferences for agricultural producers.  A 
comprehensive review of the large literature on this issue exceeds the scope of this 
dissertation.  Thus I limit discussion to the main issues identified in the review by 
Moschini and Hennessy (2001).  I then review some of the studies that specify risk 
aversion as a function of socioeconomic characteristics such as age, education level 
and family size. 
Moschini and Hennessy (2001) show how early empirical studies of 
agricultural decision making under risk elicited risk preferences from choices 
between hypothetical lotteries.  Later, using an econometric approach, studies 
imputed a measure of risk aversion from the divergence between actual farmers’ 
production decisions and optimal decisions under risk neutrality.  Due to the 
limitations of inferring risk from observed production decisions and because 
hypothetical payout surveys can give unstable results, Binswanger (1980) made real 
payments to peasants farmers in India to elicit risk preferences.  Antle (1987) 
described the optimality conditions of expected utility maximizing choices in terms of 
a given individual’s absolute risk aversion and downside risk aversion, and as an 
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econometric procedure he used the generalized method of moments (GMM).  Later 
on, Antle (1989) developed a method to estimate risk preference structures separately 
from the production technology.  Myers (1989) assumed constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) and joint lognormality of the distributions of output prices and 
producer consumption, and developed a reduced-form rational expectations approach 
to test for the aggregate level of relative risk aversion for US producers who store 
crops.  Exploiting technical attributes of CRRA and of constant partial relative risk 
aversion (CPRRA), Pope (1988) developed implications for optimal choices by 
individuals expressing such preferences.  Several studies have followed Pope’s 
approach or variations of it.  Another characteristic of research that attempts to 
determine farmers’ risk preference structures is that most of them are based on 
aggregate data (Just, 2000).  Exceptions to this are the already mentioned 
Binswanger’s lottery experiment and the Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman (1997) study. 
For this dissertation it is relevant to make a brief review of the literature that 
identifies risk preferences by assuming that farmer’s risk aversion is a function of 
socioeconomic characteristics such as age, education level and family size, among 
others.  This is necessary because in my dissertation farmers’ risk preference 
heterogeneity is tested by estimating risk aversion for each farmer as a function of his 
socioeconomic characteristics.  Moscardi and Janvry (1977) analyze the relationship 
between risk aversion and a number of socioeconomic variables that characterize 
Mexican peasant households, their access to income-generating opportunities, and 
their relation to public institutions.  Binswanger (1980) analyzes the effect of wealth, 
education level, more progressive farmers, and off-farm salaries on farmer’s risk 
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aversion.  Zeldes (1989) allows a household’s utility function to be influenced 
linearly by tastes that may differ across families and shift across time.  Tastes differ 
due to observable (for the econometrician) and unobservable factors.  The observable 
factors, which vary across families and time, are family size, age and age squared.  
This linear specification for family utility function is included in the Euler Equation 
which is estimated with data at the family-level.  Blundell et al. (1994), who also 
estimate an Euler Equation, allow the parameters that describe individual preferences 
over consumption to be a linear function of variables such as the number and age of 
children and labor market status: whether the head of the house and/or the wife are in 
paid employments, and the level of consumption itself.  Dubois (2001) also 
parameterizes agent preferences by specifying a linear function for the absolute risk 
aversion coefficient as a function of observable individual characteristics (age, 
household size, number of children, etc.). 
At the end of this section it is worthwhile to mention that the approach 
followed in this dissertation, where water rights are assets and farmers’ optimal 
decisions about water rights are treated as an investment problem that affect present 
and future income and consumption, is closely related to the so called literature on 
Agriculture Finance.  Barry and Robinson (2001) offer a good review of the main 
issues in Agriculture Finance.  One of those issues is intertemporal farm-level 
analysis in the context of life cycle planning and performance models of farm 
business, where production and consumption are linked.  Intertemporal analysis is 
expressed as the maximization of the utility of multiperiod consumption, constrained 
by the present value of wealth and the available investment alternatives, including 
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both productive investments and lending and borrowing in a perfect or imperfect 
financial market.  A second issue is the effect of farmers’ risk attitudes on their 
portfolio decisions.  In this dissertation those two elements: intertemporal farm-level 
analysis where production and consumption are linked and the effect of farmers’ risk 
attitudes on their decisions are carefully considered. 
Up to now, research on Agriculture Finance has focused on real estate as the 
dominant asset for farmers.  But now, due to the increasing interest on establishing 
transferable water rights not married to land rights, research on Agriculture Finance 
should also consider water rights as a primary asset in dry areas.  Due to the special 
characteristics of water resources, this new challenge offers a significant opportunity 
for future research.  This dissertation is an effort to contribute toward this goal. 
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Chapter 3: The Limarí River Basin’s Water Market 
The coexistence of a market for water rights and a spot market for water 
volumes is analyzed for four water user associations in the Limarí Basin in Chile’s 
IVth Region.  The existence of a legal framework that permits the transfer of water 
rights independent of land rights has contributed to the development of a very active 
water market with a variety of exchange mechanisms over the last 20 years.  The 
Limarí River basin is a semi-arid zone with approximately 65,000 hectares of 
irrigated land used mainly in traditional crops such as maize, beans or potatoes, 
horticultural production (artichokes, peppers and tomatoes), grains, grasses and other 
valuable perennial crops such as avocados, export grapes and grapes used for pisco7.  
The farmer base is diverse and consists of orchard owners, medium-sized farms 
established by past land reform programs, and a few large multinational fruit 
exporters.  Each irrigation district possesses distinct climatic characteristics that favor 
certain types of crops.  The hydrologic system of the Limarí basin is characterized as 
being primarily niveous, that is to say that it is fed from the snow-covered Andes 
Mountains.  The basin has an average annual precipitation of 140 ml.  One essential 
characteristic of this basin is the existence of three interconnected dams: Cogotí, 
Recoleta, and the Paloma Dams.  Together, these dams form the subbasin called the 
Paloma System, which has a storage capacity of one billion cubic meters and 
possesses a flexible physical system for the distribution of water based on floodgates 
and a network of siphons and canals that allow interconnection to different irrigation 
districts within this subbasin.  The current Paloma System has six Water User 
                                                 
7 Grapes used in making local liquor. 
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Associations (WUAs), four of which are analyzed in this study: i) Junta de Vigilancia 
del Río Limarí and its tributaries (JVRL); ii) Asociación de Canalistas del Canal 
Camarico (ACCC); iii) Asociación de Canalistas del Embalse Recoleta (ACER); and 
iv) Asociación de Canalistas del  Embalse Cogotí (ACEC). 
The data used in this section comes from a variety of sources.  The series of 
prices8 and transferred water rights for the period 1981-1992 were reported by 
Zegarra (2002) and, for the period 1992-2000, by Cristi et al. (2002) and Vicuña 
(2000).  These authors obtained this information through Conservador de Bienes 
Raíces of Ovalle and the records of the WUAs.  The series of prices and volumes of 
water exchanged in the spot market were constructed using the records of the WUAs, 
information obtained from the Direccion de Riego, and a farmer survey.  This survey 
was applied to a sample of farmers in the Limarí Basin on three occasions, and 
information was collected for each of the five growing seasons between 1995 and 
20009.  The surveyed sample was designed by Zegarra (2002)10 who conducted the 
first round survey. I conducted the second and third rounds (a detailed description of 
the data is included in Chapter 5). 
                                                 
8 Unless otherwise noted, all prices are expressed in 1990 Chilean pesos.  The 
average peso-dollar exchange rate in 1990 was $304.9 pesos to the American dollar. 
9 This survey was applied to 195 farmers of the region and contains production data 
and figures on land and water use, among other information.  
10 He did not develop a list of farmers to interview based on a random sample due to 
the expense of finding each sampled individual; instead, he simulated random sampling for 
farmers who were present at their farm when he conducted the survey.  He began at some 
point inside the irrigated area (stratum), interviewing farmers using a systematic round 
skipping for close neighbors.  This results in a sample, which is geographically representative 
for each irrigation organization.  The main limitation of this sampling procedure is that 
farmers who were not present at the moment of the survey had zero probability of being 
selected.  The procedure also excludes farmers who, at the moment of the survey, had 
abandoned production. 
 
 31  
The following diagram illustrates the Limarí Basin and the Paloma System. 
Figure 3.1: Limarí Basin and the Paloma System  
  
3.1 Mechanism for the Allocation of Waters in the Paloma System 
The allocation process determines the amount of water to be received by each 
user.  Conceptually, allocation is a distinct task from that of distribution.  The latter is 
defined as delivering water in accordance with allocations (Bruns and Meinzen, 
2000).  Legally, the Paloma system divides the Limarí basin into two districts: the 
irrigation district that is located above the dams, and that below them, known as the 
Paloma System.  The Paloma System is the subject of this study.  In this system, 
water rights are defined in terms of cubic meters of stored water, and water is 
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distributed simultaneously to the farmers’ plots directly from the dams through its 
associated canal network except during severe droughts when a rotating system of 
distribution (also known as shifts) is implemented. 
In the Paloma System, the responsibility of water allocation lies with the 
Junta de Vigilancia del Sistema Paloma, which reports to the Dirección de Riego 
(Irrigation Administration).  Every year, the board adds up the amount of stored water 
in the system and establishes a quantity of water for each irrigated area (and therefore 
for each WUA) based on holder’s historical shares.  The total volume of water to be 
allocated in the system depends on existing levels.  When the volume stored in the 
system is less than 500 million m3, no more than half the stored water volume may be 
assigned.  When the system contains more than 500 million m3 but less than 1 billion 
m3, the maximum global assignment is 320 million m3.  Lastly, when the volume 
exceeds 1 billion m3, free use is granted to all WUAs. 
Once water has been allocated among the WUAs, they assign the water 
volume to their members.  To do this, every season each WUA determines the 
amount of water accorded to water rights.  Then, by multiplying this amount by the 
number of water rights owned by a farmer, it determines each farmer’s endowment of 
water (expressed in cubic meters).  During most seasons, the amount of water 
accorded to water rights is determined by dividing the total allocated water to the 
WUA by the total water rights that exist within it.  Nevertheless, the expectation of 
water availability for the next season can motivate the adoption of different criteria.  
This distribution of water by the WUAs is at a farm or user level, and the WUA is 
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charged with the task of billing its associates for water use and administrative 
expenses.   
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 illustrate the variation in water accorded to water 
rights for the associations under study between 1980 and 2000.   
  Table 3.1: Average water accorded to water rights between 1980 and 2000 




ACCC 4,800 941 
ACEC 5,193 1,182 
ACER 3,955 1,168 
JVRL 6,450 1,172 
            Source: Water User Associations 
 










































Camarico Limarí Cogoti Recoleta
 
          Source: Water user associations11 
                                                 
11 In those seasons of free endowment, the highest amount of water accorded to water 
rights for the period was recorded as that for those seasons. 
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3.2 Market Activity 
The Limarí Basin beneath the dams is characterized as having an active water 
market in which a spot market and a permanent transaction market coexist.  In the 
former, volumes of water are exchanged.  In the latter, the purchase and sale of water 
rights take place over time.  After the annual allocation of water among water users 
associations based on historical criteria and the posterior distribution of it among 
farmers according to their number of water rights, the spot market reallocates this 
resource to equalize differences in the marginal return to water among farmers12.  
This process is facilitated by the existence of a significant number of farmers with 
non-perennial crops that can, with relative ease, modify their water consumption by 
varying the percentage of land used or the type of crops according to their water use 
intensity.  Moreover, water volume transactions are relatively easy due to the 
existence of significant storage capacity.  The use of flexible floodgates and the 
proper operation of the water users associations also facilitate short term transactions. 
Together, these factors support the existence of an active spot market.  This 
dissertation examines reasons for simultaneous water rights market and spot market 
activity.  
                                                 
12 Differences in the marginal return to water are measured by Hearne and Easter 
(1995).  They estimated an average value for the marginal return to water rights in the case of 
table grapes of US$ 856.7 and US$ 865.7 for the case of grapes used in pisco.  This compares 
to US$ 33.5 for potatoes and of US$317.5 for peppers, two of the main non-perennial crops 
of the basin.  
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3.2.1 Spot Market 
Because the allocation of water in each season among the WUAs in the 
Paloma System does not necessarily coincide with the water demands of each WUA, 
significant volumes of water are transferred among associations.  As such, the 
volumes of transfers received13 by the four associations studied reached 24,189,000 
m3 in the 99/00 growing season representing 7% of the total amount of water assigned 
to these associations.  This number reached 16% for the 95/96 growing season, a year 
of drought.  As I analyze each association individually, I observe that, except for 
ACER, which owns a volume of entries very similar to its actual outflows or debits, 
the rest are net claimants of water (entries greater than debits) or net sellers (debits 
greater than entries).  ACCC and ACEC are examples of net claimants, and JVRL 
stands out as an example of a net supplier.  Thus, in the 99/00 growing season, the 
irrigators of the ACCC and the ACEC obtained additional water rights from another 
district equivalent to 34% and 7% of their water consumption, respectively.  Such 
figures reached 35% and 12%, respectively, in the 95/96 season.  On the other hand, 
during the 99/00 season the JVRL transferred 20% of its water assignment to other 
associations while in the 95/96 season, transfers from that same association reached 
40%. 
That some associations are net water claimants or suppliers is explained by 
differences in the marginal return to water and its availability.  The fact that the 
                                                 
13 I can distinguish two types of water transfers:  inter-association transfers and intra-
association transfers.  The first group includes those transfers among WUAs, which can be 
both entrances (when water is received from another association) and exits (when water is 
transferred from one association to another).  The second group includes those transfers 
among irrigators within the same association. 
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ACCC and the ACEC are net claimants is explained by the presence of highly 
profitable perennial crops such as grapes, and a significant share of irrigators who 
belong to the ACEC develop crops on the land located above the Paloma Dam and 
below the Cogotí Dam with excellent weather conditions and, thus, higher marginal 
returns to water.  In the case of JVRL, the practice of river water recovery by farmers 
that increases their supply of water beyond that accorded to their water rights, partly 
explains its condition as a net water seller.   
Inside each association, irrigators produce different crops resulting in varying 
marginal returns.  This generates a significant level of internal water transfers 
between those farmers with lower marginal returns to water and those with higher 
marginal returns.  During the 99/00 growing season, the total volume of internal 
transfers for the WUAs under study reached 26,633,000 m3, which represents 8% of 
the total amount of water assigned to these associations during this season.  During 
the period 1995-2000, the highest level of internal transfers occurred inside the 
ACCC and ACEC associations accounting for 24% and 13%, respectively, of the total 
amount of water assigned to each. 
As the focus of this research is the water market, it is necessary to be precise 
about the definition of water transfer in the spot market.  First, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the volumes of water transferred in the spot market from those 
outside the spot market.  In the former, transactions may occur between farmers in 
different WUAs associations or among farmers within an association.  Transfers that 
the associations register as entries and debits have two different sources.  The first 
consists of transfers of water volumes made among different farmers and is counted 
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as water transferred in the spot market.  The second are the so-called intra-farmer 
water transfers.  This is the case for farmers with two plots of land that are irrigated 
with water from different WUAs, and the transfer reallocates water from one plot to 
another.  This is registered as a water transfer by the WUAs, but it occurs outside the 
market, and is not a spot market activity.  Transfers of water volumes among farmers 
in different WUAs and transfers of water volumes among farmers within a same 
WUA are considered spot market activities. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible from the analysis of the WUAs records to 
determine the exact magnitude of transfers between one farmer who has different 
plots of land.  Nevertheless, based on their experience, the executive directors of the 
WUAs estimate that approximately 75% of the total transfers that imply an entry or 
debit from one water association to another are made among different farmers, and 
should be considered spot market transfers.  For those transfers between an individual 
WUA, records are clear on the type of transfer that occurs.  Figure 3.3 illustrates spot 
market activity obtained by adding together the total amount of transfers among 
farmers within each WUA with 75% of the transfers that occur between different 
WUAs14.   
    
                                                 
14 The evolution of spot market activity shows that the volume of water exchanged 
reaches a low in the 97/98 growing season, an occurrence that is explained by a drought 
during the first half of the season, and by heavy rains during winter that led the WUAs to 
declare free river.  This is to say, during that same season, there was a lack of supply at the 
beginning of the season and a surplus later decreasing market activity for the season. 
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Percentage of total transfers over the total amount of water
Source: Direccion de Riego, the Paloma System Administration. 
 
3.2.2 Permanent Market 
 The spot market for water coexists with a separate market for water rights 
(henceforth referred to as the permanent market).  Beginning from an initial 
assignment of water rights by the government, these rights are reallocated to farmers 
through the market.  When analyzing the activity of this market, I observe that the 
total percentage of reallocated water rights, independent of land transactions during 
the period 1980-2000, varies from 20% to 50% by WUA.  Since the approval of the 
water law in 1981, and until 2000, more than 27% of the total water rights have been 
transferred through the permanent transactions market15 .   
                                                 
15 Adding together the water rights of the different associations is imprecise because 
the volumetric specification of these water rights is different for each association. 
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The analysis of the behavior of the permanent transactions market over time 
shows how the activity in this market has grown.  Figure 3.4 shows how the earliest 
transactions had lower volumes of trade than later periods reflecting a market that 
matured in its first decade. 






















































 Comparing the size of the spot market with the permanent market is difficult 
because the former trades in volumes of water during a specific growing season while 
a water right transaction implies the transfer of variable volumes of water over time.  
In spite of these restrictions, I have compared the relative size of both markets 
through the following steps: i) expressing the trade in rights in volumetric terms for 
each season using the average amount of water accorded to water rights (see Table 
3.1); ii) assuming that the sale (purchase) of a water right in any season is equivalent 
to the sale (purchase) of the amount of water accorded to that right in the 
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spot market in all following seasons16; iii) assuming that only a portion of the 
transfers among WUAs are conducted through the spot market due to the accounting 
conventions discussed above in Section 3.2.1.  These conventions require that we 
consider the following two scenarios.  In one, only transfers among different farmers 
within a WUA are counted as spot market transactions (scenario 1); and in the other 
transfers among different farmers within a WUA plus 75% of the transfers among 
WUAs are counted as spot market transactions (scenario 2)17.  A possible drawback 
of this method is that it could lead to an over estimation of the relative size of the 
permanent market because rights may be transferred several times in the period under 
study resulting in the volume of water associated with those rights being double 
counted.  However, the history of water right transfers independent of land 
transactions shows that few farmers who buy water rights sell them later.  The 
exceptions are a few water right holders who do not own land, but buy water rights to 
sell them when prices rise.  The detailed operation of the market indicates that 
overestimation of the permanent market is not significant.  As a result, I conclude that 
                                                 
16 One possible scenario is as follows: 
Association XX 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 
Exchanged water 
rights (in cubic 
meters) 
100 200 100 50 100 
Total cubic 
meters 
100 300 400 450 550 
 
17 As I already mentioned, 75% of the total transfers that involve a change of water 
association are assumed to be transfers among different farmers; therefore, they are 
considered to spot market transactions.  This assumption is based on interviews of the 
executive directors of the four water user associations under study.  Moreover, the content in 
this chapter was presented in the in the city of Ovalle (Limarí Valley) in a seminar with more 
than 20 attendees that included the executive directors and the water engineers of the WUAs.  
During the presentation, I emphasized the assumption that few farmers that buy water rights 
sell them later independent of land sales, and that approximately 75% of the transfers among 
WUAs are done through the spot market.  However, many non-attendees disagreed with those 
assumptions.   
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for the period 1995-2000, the water transferred in the spot market was 3.8 times 
greater than transfers in the permanent market under scenario 1 and nearly 7 times 
that in scenario 2. 
3.3 Price Behavior in the Water Market 
To verify if a market behaves in an efficient manner, I test to determine 
whether prices reflect the relative scarcity of water.  In the following sections, I will 
show that water prices in the spot market reflect its relative seasonal scarcity.  In 
regards to the permanent market, the systematic rise in the real prices of water rights 
reflects a sustained expansion of the demand for water over time. 
3.3.1 Spot Market 
Evidence exists that the behavior of prices in the spot market reflects the 
relative scarcity of the resource.  Analysis of the period 1995-2000 illustrates that the 
maximum real price per cubic meter of water is reached in all the WUAs in the 96/97 
growing season, which suffered a drought.  When comparing the real prices between 
the 96/97 season and a normal season such as 99/00, prices during the drought season 
are between 3 and 12 times greater than those of a normal season, varying by 
association.  The capacity of the spot market to reflect the relative scarcity of water 
can also be observed through the correlation coefficient of water availability and the 
average real price per cubic meter, which is –0.921 for the five growing seasons 
between 1995 and 200018 . 
                                                 
18 This coefficient correlates the average real price of water in the spot market with 
the sum of the water accorded to water rights in the WUAs between 1995 and 2000.  The 
price in the spot market is estimated as a weighted average of the prices as reported by 
surveyed farmers that exchanged water.  Overall, 123 observations of temporal transfers in 
five growing seasons were used. 
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3.3.2 Permanent Market 
The increasing scarcity of water due to a sustained expansion of the demand 
over time has produced a systematic rise in the real prices of water rights.  Thus, 
during the period 1986-2000, the price of water rights experienced real increases 
ranging from 41% to 240% depending upon the association.  Figure 3.5 illustrates the 
evolution of these prices over time. 


















































Heterogeneity in the prices of water rights among associations tends to 
diminish over time with exception of ACEC.  The higher water rights prices in some 
associations are largely explained by differences in the alternative mechanisms to 
purchase water rights.  More specifically, I can distinguish between two markets: The 
first is restricted to the area below the Cogotí Dam and above the Paloma Dam, which 
is characterized by limited suppliers of water rights due to the relatively small number 
of farmers.  In addition, several farmers in this area grow export grapes and have a 
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higher marginal return on water than farmers located in other zones in the basin.  The 
second one includes the area below the Paloma Dam, and is characterized by the 
existence of a relatively large number of irrigators.  Increasing the number of farmers 
increases the dispersion of reservation values improving the probability of water right 
sales.  Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the reservation values of a permanent right to one 
cubic meter of water as reported by farmers from the ACEC and ACER WUAs.  As 
expected, water right reservation values are higher in the former market.  
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3.4 Market Expectations and Access to Information  
 
By observing water transactions in the spot market in each season, it is 
possible to see that in most seasons the market does not become active until after the 
passage of winter when the volume of rainfall is known and the need for water 
increases due to the hot, dry summer weather.  This seasonality provides some 
support to the statement that the farmers have homogeneous information with respect 
to the future; therefore, no additional benefits are associated with advance purchases 
and sales of water volumes.  The exception to this behavior is observed in the 97/98 
growing season, which was preceded by a severe drought.  The experience of three 
previous years of drought and the relatively high prices in the spot market at the 
beginning of that season could have motivated advance water purchases by farmers 
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who expected water prices to increase and advance water sales from sellers who 
expected water prices to decrease.  This seasonal behavior of the spot water market 
and the advance sales of water in the 97/98 growing season are illustrated in Figure 
3.8 for ACEC.  
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With respect to rain expectations and the expected amount of water accorded 
to water rights, I found agreement among surveyed farmers.  When asked during the 
third round survey about rain expectations for the following season, 70% responded 
that it would be a normal year.  In addition, farmers were asked in that same survey to 
estimate the amount of water accorded to water rights in the following year as a share 
of what they currently receive.  Almost 50% of surveyed farmers estimated that the 
water accorded to their water rights in the following period would be between 90% 
and 120% of their current level.  The majority of the remaining farmers (47%) admit 
that they do not have an estimate of the future level of water accorded to water rights.  
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With regard to information access, I observe that the majority of the farmers are well 
informed about water availability in the dams.  When asked about the level of the 
dams, 85% of them correctly answered that the dam was half-full or full19. 
3.5 Summary 
The current water law in Chile has been flexible enough to allow the Paloma 
System, in the Limarí Basin, to develop not only an active market for water rights, but 
also an active market for volumes of water, i.e. a spot market.  The volume of water 
exchanged in this market indicates that this mechanism of water allocation is highly 
important.  In the permanent market, more than 27% of existing water rights were 
exchanged independently of land transfers between 1981 and 2000. 
A flexible water market such as the spot market in the Paloma System allows 
for the reallocation of water to those areas in which the water acquires its greatest 
value.  This market -contrary to what other researches believe- is active not only in 
drought years but also in years with average water availability.  Thus, in the 99/00 
season characterized by the average water availability, approximately 14% of the 
water allocated to the four main WUAs of the basin was reallocated through 
exchange in the spot market.  During the severe drought of the 95/96 season that 
figure reached a value of 21%. 
The Water User Associations are a primary factor in determining the correct 
functioning of the market.  Thanks to good organization and efficient management of 
their records of water allocation, it has been possible to develop an active spot 
market.  Together with the Water Use Associations, it is also clear that the existence 
                                                 
19 At the time of the third round survey the amount of stored water stood at 70% of its 
total capacity.  
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of a safe supply source, such as the three dams that form the Paloma System, is a 
necessary condition for the existence of a spot market.  
The correlation between the growth in the relative scarcity of water over time 
and the prices of water rights, as well the correlation between the scarcity of water per 
season and the price of water in the spot market, indicates that water markets operate 
correctly.  At the same time, for the market for water rights there is some 
heterogeneity in prices that tends to diminish over time with exception of ACEC.  
This heterogeneity is also captured when farmers are asked about their reservation 
price for a water right.  As expected, water right reservation values are higher for the 
farmers that belong to ACEC.  
Finally, survey questions regarding access to relevant information and water 
market expectations supports the hypothesis that farmers’ access to information is 
homogeneous and farmers form similar expectations with regard to future water 
prices and the availability of water supplies.  From this, I assume in the coming 
chapters that farmers have homogeneous expectations with respect to the main 
stochastic variables in the water markets. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Model 
In this chapter I pursue an explanation for water rights trading, which arises 
whenever there are differences in the reservation value of the water right asset.  I use 
this reservation value as a proxy for private valuation, and hypothesize that difference 
in reservation values arise from heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences.  To establish 
the importance of heterogeneity in farmer preferences, I first consider a simple model 
where investors are risk neutral.  Under this assumption, the price of a water right is 
equal to the expected discount sum over time of the spot market values of the amount 
of water accorded to that water right.  
4.1 A Simple Model 
Let us define Rt  as the return on a water right in period t.  It is a function of 
the change in the water right price between t+1 and t, where tθ  denotes the water 
right price in period t, the spot market price per cubic meter, st , and the total water 
(in cubic meters) accorded to each water right in season t, denoted by vt .  I assume 
that θ , s and v  are stochastic variables that are revealed during each growing season.  
Thus, at t the values of tθ , st  and vt are known.  Hence, the return on a water right is 
what can be earned by buying a water right in period t, selling the assigned volume of 
water on the spot market in period t+1, and then re-selling the water right in period 
t+1: 
1 1 1 .1




− ++ + +=+               (4.1.1) 
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In order to simplify the analysis I can assume that the expected water right 
return is equal to a constant, R, and:  
[ ]E R Rt t l =+ , for l= 0,1,2,..             (4.1.2) 
where Et  stands for the expectation operator conditional on the information set 
available at time t, which is assumed to be known by all farmers. 
The assumption that the expected return remains constant is sometimes known 
as the Martingale Model of stock prices.  Although that assumption of constant stock 
returns contradicts the empirical evidence of returns behavior over time, it is 
analytically convenient for the goal of this section, which is to show the importance 
of heterogeneity in farmer preferences in the reservation values of water rights.  
Developing the model with time-varying expected returns will lead to the same 
conclusion, but the analysis is cumbersome because the relationship between prices 
and returns becomes nonlinear (Campbell, et al., 1997, Chapter 7.1). 
By taking expectations in (4.1.1) over 1tθ +  and 1 1s vt t+ + , imposing (4.1.2), 
and rearranging terms, I obtain an equation that links the current water right price 




s vt t tEt t R
θθ + + + +=  + 
              (4.1.3) 
Recursively iterating forward the future prices of water rights and using the 
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Ruling out the possibility of a rational bubble in the market, i.e. the water 
right price tθ  is not expected to grow forever at a rate R or faster, the second term on 
the right-hand side of this equation shrinks to zero as the time horizon, L, increases.  




E s vt t t l t lRl
θ
 ∞   = 	 + +
  + = 
                        (4.1.5) 
If all farmers have identical expectations about water right returns, R , water 
prices in the spot market, st l+ , and water quantities accorded to each water 
right, vt l+ , then they would have identical private water right valuations (or 
reservation values), and no trading would take place.   
To explain why water rights are exchanged in the Limarí Valley water market, 
some type of heterogeneity among farmers must be assumed.  As I mentioned in 
Chapter 3, farmers’ market expectations and access to information indicate that 
farmers have homogeneous information regarding the future of water prices and 
water quantities accorded to water rights and, thus, homogeneous expectations.  The 
analysis of rain expectations and the expected amount of water accorded to water 
rights for the coming season revealed a high coincidence in answers among surveyed 
farmers who were also well informed about water availability in the dams.  
Consequently, I focus on other types of heterogeneity among farmers to explain 
differences in reservation values for a water right.  One source for farmer 
heterogeneity arises from differences in the marginal productivity of water due to 
differences in soil quality, equipment (for example tractor use), and irrigation 
systems, among others.  These differences in marginal productivity are resolved in the 
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spot market for water, where farmers with higher marginal productivity will buy 
water from farmers with lower marginal productivity until the differences vanish in 
each agricultural season.  Hadjigeorgalis, (2000) provides a theoretical and empirical 
proof for this statement as well as empirical evidence of a unique price of water in the 
spot market for the whole area below dams in the Limarí Valley.  Accordingly, 
differences in marginal productivity are not sufficient to explain trading in the market 
for water rights. 
Another potential source of heterogeneity is a variety of idiosyncratic random 
shocks that affect farmers’ income.  Constantinides (1996) and Heaton and Lucas 
(1996), among others, consider the effect of idiosyncratic random shocks on asset 
prices.  Farmers in the Limarí Valley face independent shocks to their incomes as 
revealed by the second survey when some farmers reported important frost damage to 
their crops in just one night.  Pest infestations are another potential source of shock, 
although the farmers under study use pesticides.  If farmers face incomplete asset 
markets these shocks affect consumption and hence the reservation values for a water 
right if farmers are not risk neutral.  In practice, that is the case because most farmers 
do not insure against transitory idiosyncratic shocks.  The spot market for water helps 
farmers to smooth household consumption, but does not totally preclude them from 
the need to modify consumption due to idiosyncratic shocks.   
Finally, heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences is a sufficient condition for 
differences in the reservation value of water rights among farmers.  In the next 
section, I develop a model of a farmer’s decision for optimal consumption and 
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investment in water rights and use it to illustrate the role of incomplete asset 
markets20 and farmers’ preferences upon reservation values for water rights 
4.2 The Farmer’s Decision Rule under Water and Output 
Uncertainty 
The goal of this section is to analyze the role of farmers’ preferences in 
determining reservation values for water rights.  I consider the case of irrigated 
agricultural land in a region with stochastic water availability.  The farmer has 
income that can either be consumed or invested in water rights.  In this problem 
uncertainty comes from different sources: output uncertainty in season t, future spot 
market and water right prices, and future amounts of water accorded to water rights. 
The particular model I develop for farmer consumption and investment in 
water rights is based on the conventional consumption-based capital asset-pricing 
model (CCAPM) where the asset under study is a water right.  In this model, water 
right returns are linked to marginal rates of substitution for consumption at different 
points in time.  Alternatively, a production-based asset-pricing model (PCAPM) may 
be developed emphasizing the linkages between asset returns and investment and 
production variables.  Data availability is key when it comes to deciding between the 
CCAPM and the PCAPM.  The first requires consumption data and the second 
investment and capital data.  Unfortunately, my data is not ideally suited to either of 
these.  First, while it reports farm equipment, it differs broadly in regards to numbers, 
quality and age, and any effort to value farmer capital is unreliable.  Second, it does 
not contain information on consumption.  I do have reliable data on current net 
                                                 
20 Incomplete asset markets occurs when some insurance markets are absent so that 
farmers can not insure against each state of nature. 
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income which, in a framework with incomplete asset markets, is correlated with 
consumption21.  For this reason I have chosen the CCAPM.   
I assume that the farmer’s optimal decision rule regarding consumption and 
investment in each season is the solution to the maximization of the expectation of his 
intertemporal utility of consumption subject to a budget constraint.  I consider the 
case of a farmer for whom the intertemporal utility of consumption takes the form of 
a time-additively separable function, such that the expected present value of his utility 
is given by: 
( )
1




                                  (4.2.1) 
with i=1…,n and t=1…,T.  Here n is the total number of farmers, T is the total 
number of seasons, Cit  denotes farmer i’s consumption in season t and ρ  is a 
constant discount factor measuring the rate of time preferences.  Given that 0< ρ <1, 
one unit of utility tomorrow is valued less than one unit of utility today.  The utility 
function ( )U   is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, with 
( )dU CtUt dCt





′′ = <0, i.e. the marginal utility of consumption is 
                                                 
21 Under the permanent-income hypothesis, proposed by Milton Friedman in 1957, 
increases and decreases in income that farmers see as temporary have little effect on their 
consumption spending.  Nevertheless, that independence between consumption and current 
income requires the capacity of farmers to counteract specific random shocks on their current 
income.  They are able to do that if they have access to a complete asset market or have assets 
that deliver wealth when they face unexpected reductions on their current income.  If none of 
those conditions is fulfilled then consumption is highly correlated with current income. 
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positive, but it decreases with consumption.  Expectations in (4.2.1) are taken 
conditional on information available at t. 
The assumption of a time-additively separable utility is standard in the 
literature, but it is not without restriction.  It implies that farmers’ current utility is not 
affected by the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (Duffie et al., 1997).  In other 
words, it rules out preferences for early or for late resolution of uncertainty.  A 
second drawback of this utility function is that the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution is inversely linked with the coefficient of relative risk aversion (Epstein 
and Zin, 1981 and Just, 2000).  Finally, farmers’ current utility is assumed to be 
unaffected by past consumption.  This rules out habit formation in consumption 
where the marginal utility of future consumption is increasing with the level of past 
consumption.  Just (2000), demonstrates that assuming additive separability of utility 
may be inadequate for studying longer-term agricultural production problems.  This is 
so because the expected utility over a time horizon with an additive separability 
function does not take into account possible correlations across time of the variable 
over which utility is specified.  In my setting, the role of habit formation is mitigated 
for two reasons: i) survey field experience indicates that durable goods are only a 
small share of farmers’ consumption bundles in the Limarí Valley; and ii) optimal 
consumption depends on state variables that are related to the past history of 
consumption and investment.  This indirectly links utilities of different periods 
(Bossaerts, 2002).  A primary advantage of time-additive utility is that preferences are 
recursive and this allows dynamic programming methods to be used to analyze 
optimal decisions.  Chavas (2004) points out that nonadditive preferences are more 
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difficult to specify and evaluate, and he concludes by stating that “The reader should 
keep in mind that the time-additive model remains a popular framework for the 
analysis of dynamic behavior”. 
Before developing a model of farmers’ consumption and investment 
decisions, two main features of the water market under analysis require discussion.  
First, the aggregate demand curve for water volumes in the spot market is assumed to 
be deterministic.  Consequently, s jt  which is the price of water in the spot market of 
WUA j in season t, varies from one season to another as water supply changes.  Thus, 
I have: 
( )s s vjt jt= .                                                                                  (4.2.2) 
Because the number of water rights is fixed in every WUA, changes in water 
supply are explained only by changes in v jt . 
The second important feature of this case study is that water supply depends 
on the level of water in the dams, which is known at the beginning of the agricultural 
season in April.  At this time each WUA determines the amount of water accorded to 
each water right, v jt .  Hence, uncertainty about water availability and the price of 
water in the spot market is eliminated at the beginning of each season although it 
remains unresolved for future seasons.  Nevertheless, the WUAs may change the 
amount of water accorded to water rights after April.  This can be due to high levels 
of rain in the winter or to the extraordinary size of snow packs, the main source of 
water for the dams formed in the surrounding mountains during the winter months of 
May, June and July, which could generate a water flow that overwhelms the storage 
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capacity of the dams during the summer.  In these cases, the WUAs declare “free 
river” so each farmer can take freely whatever amount of water he requires22.  The 
analysis of the time series of v for ACEC over 46 seasons shows that this WUA 
declared free river in only 8 seasons and there were no seasons for which it modified 
the amount of v announced at the beginning of the season.  The JVRL announced a 
modification on v at the beginning of a season in 5 out of the 22 observed seasons, 
with an average change of 17%, and declared free river in four seasons.  For the other 
WUAs, either this information is not available or they did not modify v except when 
declaring free river23.  For the purposes of my analysis I assume that the normal case 
is when water accorded to water rights is known at the beginning of the season and 
does not change.  This means that v jt  and ( )s s vjt jt= are known by the farmers at 
that time.  
The farmer’s stochastic problem is to choose a sequence of consumption over 
time that maximizes the farmer’s expected utility in equation (4.2.1) subject to: an 
                                                 
22 In theory, the amount of water accorded to water rights announced at the beginning 
of the season may be reduced although this never occurred in the years under study.  In 
addition, the WUA of the Cogotí dam permitted the dam to run dry in seven seasons between 
1954 and 2000. 
23 Number of seasons in which the WUAs declared free river. 
WUA Number of growing seasons in the 
available series for v jt  
Number of years declared 
free river 
ACCC 20 7 
ACEC 46 8 
JVRL 22 4 
ACER 23 5 
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initial stock of water rights 0N , a budget constraint, and a water availability 
constraint.  
Due to the fact that most of the farmers in the Limarí Valley face incomplete 
markets24, it is reasonable to assume that farmers’ decisions over consumption 
depend on net revenue from current production and current income from water 
transactions.  Thus, the budget constraint for farmer i in WUA j is defined by: 
( ) ( ) C , ,1N N s z P T f w X r X Iit jt it it jt it it it it it it it it itθ ε ′= − + + − +−     (4.2.3) 
The first two terms of the right hand side of the budgets constraint represent 
net income from water transactions, where jtθ  denotes the price of a water right in 
WUAj  at period t and is the same for all farmers in a WUAj; Nit  is the number of 
water rights held by farmer i during season t; ( )1N Njt it itθ −−  is the net cost of 
investment in water rights at time t; s jt  denotes the spot market price per cubic meter 
in WUAj in season t, and zit  is the volume of water exchanged in the spot market by 
farmer i in season t, where zit >0 implies sale of water volumes and zit <0  implies 
the purchase of water volumes.  The third and fourth terms in the budget constraint 
represent net revenue from production, where Tit  is the total amount of cultivated 
land; ( ), ,f X wit it itε  denotes a per hectare production function of an aggregate 
output; wit  denotes the volume of water used as an input in production and Xit  is a 
vector of inputs different from water (all inputs are expressed in terms of per hectare); 
itε  represents the value of a vector of shocks that are partially determined by nature; 
                                                 
24 Farmers face incomplete markets because only few of them have crop insurance 
and access to credit is limited. 
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Pit  is the price of the aggregate output faced by farmer i in season t; and rit  is the 
vector of input prices for Xit .  Output and input prices are assumed to be known.  
Finally, Iit  represents farmer’s “other net income” sources including consumption or 
production credit, land transactions, livestock exchanges and work off-farm.  
The water availability constraint is:  
    N v z T wit jt it it it≥ +
25.                                              (4.2.4) 
It limits the amount of water that a farmer can use for irrigation, T wit it , and the total 
volume that he can exchange in the spot market, zit .  
Without violating the rule that utility is function of consumption26, I can 
substitute the budget and the water constraints inside the utility function and express 
the farmer’s expected present value of utility as:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ), ,1
1
T tE U N N s N v T w P T f w X r X Ijt it it jt it jt it it it it it it it it it it
t
ρ θ ε ′− + − + − +	 −
=
           
(4.2.5) 
The farmer’s problem now involves choosing investment in water rights and 
input quantities to maximize his expected discounted sum of utility in equation 
(4.2.5), subject to an initial stock of water rights.  Hence, the consumption decision 
problem has been transformed to an investment and production decision problem. 
                                                 
25 This assumption is an oversimplification because farmers in some WUAs may 
occasionally use more water than the volume they obtain for the season by asking for an 
advance on water from the next season.  Farmers also may save water from one season to the 
next, but there is a penalty of 15 to 20% of the endowment due to projected evaporation 
losses making this practice rare (Zegarra 2002).  
26 “..good economists are unhappy about a utility function that has wealth in it.  Few 
of us are like Disney’s Uncle Scrooge, who got pure enjoyment out of a daily swim in the 
coins in his vault.  Wealth is only valuable because it gives us access to more consumption. 
Utility functions should always be written over consumption” (Cochrane, 2005, pg. 157). 
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The overall problem of finding the optimal sequence of water rights 
transactions can be solved by using a standard dynamic programming approach, i.e. 
by finding the optimal amount of water rights, itN  for t=1,… T, and input quantities 
( ,w Xit it ), that satisfy the recursive functional equation: 




( , )            , ,1 , ,
( , )1
N N s N v T wjt it it jt it jt it it
E Ut
V N Max P T f w X r X Iit it w X N it it it it it it it itit it it




   − + − +−  
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                                                  (4.2.6) 
where itµ  is the vector itµ = ( ), , , , ,v s T P rjt jt jt it it itθ ′ .  For notational simplicity, the 
dependence of the value function on the term itµ  will be suppressed in what follows 
unless it is needed to avoid confusion.  The value function, ( )1V Nit− , denotes the 
value of the stock of water rights held from t-1 to t, 1Nit− , after the optimal sequence 
of itN , t=1,…T  has been determined and is the indirect utility function of that same 
stock of water rights.  In the first term the expectation is over itε (its value is resolved 
at harvest time) and the random variable Iit .  The values of ,  ,  s vjt jt jtθ  are known 
at t but their future values are unknown.  The values of Tit  and 1Tit+  are assumed to 
be known.  Thus, the expectation in the second term is over 1itε + , as well 
as ,  ,  1 1 1s vjt j jtθ+ + + , and 1Iit+ .  Output prices, Pit , and input prices, rit , are 
certain.  The control variables are Nit , wit  and Xit .  The state variables are 1Nit−  
and itµ .  I assume that ( )U   and ( )f   are continuously differentiable, the value 
 
 60  
function is differentiable in Nit , and that the optimization problem has an interior 
solution. 
The first order condition with respect to Nt  (omitting the indices i and j for 
convenience) is: 
      ( ) [ ]1E U s v E Vt t t t t t tθ ρ′ ′ ∗ − = +                         (4.2.7) 
where ( )1V V N Nt t t′ = ∂ ∂+  is the marginal value of a water right held at the 
beginning of period t+1. 
Using the envelope theorem, the right hand term in (4.2.7) can be expressed in 
terms of the discount factor, marginal utility, water right prices and the spot market 
value of water accorded to each water right.  I begin with the value function for 
period t+1 evaluated at the optimal level of each one of the variables that are included 
in it: 
( ) ( )
( )
[ ]
1 1 1 1 1 11
1
( ) , ,1 1 1 1 1 1
( )1 1
N N s N v T wt t t t t it ttE Ut
V N P f w X r Xt t t t t t t
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        (4.2.8) 
Then I differentiate equation (4.2.8) with respect to Nt , to obtain: 
[ ]1 1 1 1V E Ut t t tθ′ ′=+ + + + .                                   (4.2.9) 
 Next I substitute equation (4.2.9) into equation (4.2.7), and use the Law of 
Iterated Expectations, to obtain the first order condition with respect to Nt : 
( ) [ ]s v E Ut t t t tθ ′− = [ ]1 1E Ut t tρ θ′+ +                                 (4.2.10) 
Equation (4.2.10) is the so-called Euler Equation.  The left hand side term 
indicates how much the farmer’s utility increases if the available income for 
 
 61  
consumption rises due to a sale of a water right at the price of tθ .  The deduction of 
s vt t  from tθ , to get the net income from selling a water right, is due to the fact that 
whenever a farmer sells a water right he will not be able to sell the amount of water 
accorded to that water right, vt  , on the spot market at a value of s vt t .  The right hand 
side term is the farmer’s expected discounted utility of keeping the water right from 
season t to t+1, which may also be interpreted as the farmer’s expected forgone 
discounted utility if he sells a water right in season t.  In other words, this term can be 
understood as the marginal cost of selling a water right in period t.  Thus, (4.2.10) 
reflects the optimality condition that the marginal benefit of selling a water right (the 
left hand side term) is equal to its marginal cost (the right hand side term).  This 
allows me to interpret equation (4.2.10) as giving the marginal value or willingness to 
pay for a water right (Cochrane, 2005, Chapter 2.1).  More specifically, I can rewrite 
the Euler Equation as: 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1, ,1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
, ,1
N N s N v T wt t t t t t t t
Ut t
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(4.2.11) 
where the term on the right hand side of (4.2.11) is the willingness to pay or the 
reservation value for a water right. 
Furthermore, the stochastic discount factor in this problem is defined by the 
random variable 1Mt+ , where: 
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 , ,1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 , ,1
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(4.2.12) 
Thus, the Euler Equation becomes: 
[ ]1 1s v E Mt t t t t tθ θ= + + +            (4.2.13) 
Following the tradition of the literature on asset pricing, the Euler Equation 
can be written as: 
11 1




 += +  +
 
.           (4.2.14) 
The right hand side term in (4.2.14) is the discounted expected value of the 
marginal rate of return to holding a water right from time t to time t+1.  This marginal 
return is comprised of two terms: the first term is s vt t tθ , and it represents the rate of 
return to a water right when the water accorded to it is sold in the spot market; and the 
second term is 1t tθ θ+ , which represents the rate of change in the water right price 
from season t to season t+1.  Finally, expression (4.2.14) indicates that the optimal 
investment in a water right occurs when the discounted expected value of the 
marginal return to holding an extra water right is equal to 1.  This formula is the 
foundation of the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). 
The Euler Equation can also be written in terms of the value of water accorded 
to each water right in the spot market, 1 1t ts v+ + , for t = 0,1,2…T.  To do this I solve 
equation (4.2.13) forward by repeatedly substituting out the future price of water 
rights, 1tθ + , for l = 1,2…T, and I obtain: 
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[ ]1 1E Mt t t t t tvsθ θ= + + +  
[ ]1 1 1 1 2 2E Mt t t t t tvsθ θ= ++ + + + + +  
[ ]2 22 2 3 3E Mt t t t t tvsθ θ= ++ + + + + +  
  
[ ] [ ]2 21 1 1 1 1 2E M E E M Mt t t t t t t t t t t t tv v vs s sθ  = + ++ + + + + + + +   
which, by the Law of Iterated Expectations, becomes: 
       [ ]2 2 21 1 1 1E M v M M vt t t t t t t t t t tvs s sθ = + ++ + + + + + +                           (4.2.15) 
This equation states that the reservation value of a water right in period t is 
determined by adding together the present and expected future values of the amount 
of water accorded to a water right in the spot market, discounted by the stochastic 
discount factor.  In order to explain the economics behind this statement, consider a 
representative farmer who lives only two periods, t and t+1, and has only one water 
right, which is accorded one m3 of water.  If that farmer decides to use his cubic 
meter of water as an input in crop production, he does so because he obtains a greater 
return than what is expected from selling that water in the spot market.  In 
equilibrium, he would then buy water in the spot market until the marginal benefit of 
water used as an input equals the expected present benefit of selling water in the spot 
market27.  
                                                 
27 This is the case for a costless spot market for water such as that of the Limarí 
Valley.  Up to now, nobody has measured the real transaction cost on the spot market.  
Zegarra (2002) indicates costs should be significant because when he conducted his survey in 
the Limarí Valley, farmers were facing a severe drought and complaining about the difficulty 
in purchasing water in the spot market.  However, that is not in itself a proof of high 
transaction costs.  What happened is that, due to the severe drought, prices were quite high at 
that point, and several farmers were not willing to pay those prices.  Indeed an active water 
market existed at that time in Ovalle’s plaza with water being sold to the highest bidder. 
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In order to examine the role of risk preferences and incomplete asset markets 
in the reservation value for water rights as well as in water rights trading, it is 
convenient to write the Euler Equation in terms of the covariance between the 
stochastic discount factor and the price of a water right.  Using the definition of 
covariance [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ],1 1 1 1 1 1E M Cov M E M Et t t t t t t t t tθ θ θ= ++ + + + + + , I can write 
(4.2.13) with the sub index i and j as: 
           [ ] ,1 1 1 1s v E M E Cov Mjt jt jt t it t jt t it jtθ θ θ   = + ++ + + +                     (4.2.16) 
Equation (4.2.16) splits the farmer’s reservation value of a water right into the 
expected discounted marginal rate of return to holding a water right from time t to 
time t+1, [ ]1 1s v E M Ejt jt t it t jtθ + + +   , and a risk premium, ,1 1Cov Mt it jtθ + +  .  
Thus, differences in reservation values for a water right, among farmers in a same 
water association and under the assumption of farmers’ identical expectations on 
1jtθ + , require differences in the expected value of the random variables 1Mit+  
and/or in the covariance between 1Mit+  and 1jtθ + .   
If farmers are risk neutral then the expected value of 1Mit+  will be the same 
for all farmers and risk premium is zero.  Risk neutral farmers utility function over 
consumption can be represented by: ( ) 0 1U C Cit itα α= + .  Since ( ) 1U Cit α′ = , the 




U CitMit E U Ct it
ρ ′ +=+ ′  





=  (Chavas, 
2004, Chapter 10).  In this case the covariance term, [ ],1 1Cov Mt it itθ+ + , would 
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vanish and the optimality condition reduces to 1s v Ejt jt jt t jtθ ρθ= + + , which is the 
same as derived from the simple model in equation (4.1.5). 
If farmers face complete asset markets that provide full insurance, then a 
farmer’s specific random shocks to current income will not affect his consumption.  
In this case the stochastic discount factor 1Mit+  depends on aggregate temporal 
shocks.  If it is also assumed that farmers have homogenous preferences, then they are 
all characterized by the same, unique stochastic discount factor, i.e. 1Mit+ = 1Mt+  
(Campbell, 1997, Chapter 8.1).  In this case the expected value of the random 
variables 1Mit+  and the covariance between 1Mit+ and 1jtθ +  will not differ among 
farmers and water right reservation values will be the same for all farmers. 
To summarize, under the assumption that farmers have identical expectations 
regarding 1jtθ + , differences in reservation values for a water right among farmers in 
the same water association can only arise if there are incomplete markets or if farmers 
have heterogeneous preferences that are not risk neutral.  In that case there are 
multiple stochastic discount factors that satisfy equation (4.2.16). 
How risk aversion affects water rights transactions depends on the sign of the 
risk premium, ,1 1Cov Mt it jtθ + +  .  The risk premium increases with risk aversion, 
so if the covariance between 1Mit+  and 1jtθ + is positive then more risk averse 
farmers will place a higher value on water rights than less risk averse farmers, and the 
former will buy water rights from the latter.  In the case under study, with incomplete 
asset markets, water rights are used not only to obtain water but also to smooth 
consumption.  This is because water rights allow farmers to insure themselves against 
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bad shocks to production income and hence consumption.  Thus, water right prices 
covary negatively with consumption and because a farmer’s marginal utility of 
consumption is decreasing in consumption, the ,1 1Cov Mt it jtθ + +   is positive.   
Finally, optimal variable input quantities are obtained from the following first 
order conditions: 
( )( )* , , 0E U P T f w X st t it it w it it it jtε ′ − =      (for water)                     (4.2.17) 
( )( )* , ,  0E U P T f w X rt t it it x it it it itε ′ − =      (for other inputs)           (4.2.18) 
The first order condition for water in (4.2.17) can be written as: 
( ) ( )( )[ ]
, , ,
, ,




  = −  ′
.  This provides 
an intuitive interpretation of the first order condition for water: at the optimal input 
use, the expected marginal value product, ( ), ,E P T f w Xt it it w it it itε   , is equal to the 
input price, plus the marginal risk premium, 
( )( )
[ ]





.  An 
identical interpretation applies to the first order conditions for the other inputs 
(Chavas, 2004, Chapter 8). 
4.3 Market Frictions and Consumption-Based Asset Pricing for 
Water Rights 
Before concluding this chapter, I discuss market frictions that may affect the 
consumption-based capital asset pricing model upon which the expressions for the 
farmer’s private reservation value of a water right are based.  At the heart of the 
consumption-based capital asset pricing model is the condition that discounted 
expected marginal utilities should be equilibrated across time, as implied by equation 
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(4.2.14).  In the presence of market frictions this equality may become an inequality 
such as 1 11
tE Mt t s vt t t
θ
θ
 + ≤ + − 
 or as 1 11
tE Mt t s vt t t
θ
θ
 + ≥ + − 
.  He and Modest (1995) 
review some of the market frictions that may produce such inequalities including: i) a 
non-short sales constraint, which prevents the short selling of some assets; ii) 
solvency constraints, which restrict the wealth process at some future date from 
falling below some predetermined level; iii) transaction costs that include bid-ask 
spreads and commissions; and iv) borrowing constraints, which preclude investor’s 
current consumption from exceeding their current wealth. 
The two-round survey I conducted among farmers in the Limarí Valley shows 
that they have low levels of education, and most own less than 6 hectares.  These 
figures suggest that sophisticated market activities, such as short sales or solvency 
constraints, are not relevant for this study.  Excess liquidity and an intermediary 
institution are necessary for short selling to work properly and the development of 
more sophisticated markets where speculators can take short positions.  Such is not 
the case for water markets in Chile where the size of the market greatly reduces the 
possibility that a market maker has a counterpart.  The difficulty in hedging against 
production shocks and the lack of crop insurance creates uncertainty with respect to 
future income.  The spot market for water plays a role in smoothing income, but not 
nearly enough to avoid distress land sales by insolvent farmers.  This suggests that for 
the case under study there are two constraints that may be important: transaction costs 
and borrowing constraints.  
A large literature on the impact of transaction costs on asset prices has 
developed.  Some authors emphasize the cost in terms of bid-ask spreads (Luttmer, 
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1996), the existence of illiquid assets as a consequence of transaction costs (Vayanos 
and Jean-Luc Vila, 1999), or the presence of transaction costs that are endogenously 
determined  because investors adjust trading frequencies (Constantinides, 1986).  
Heaton and Lucas (1996) interpret transaction costs not as a trading cost, but rather as 
a wedge between the borrowing and lending rates due to monitoring and other costs 
incurred in each period.  Gollier (2001) emphasizes that risk reduces long-term 
savings on assets if the trading cost of the assets is high.  In spite of differences in the 
definition of transaction costs among authors, they do agree that for short periods, 
transaction costs are important, but over time, they become insignificant.  Thus, a 
one-period transaction cost will be less significant if traders that buy an asset hold it 
for many periods. 
To show that transaction costs do not have much effect in the present study, I 
start with Gollier’s (2001) findings on illiquid assets.  I also assume that the existence 
of a costless spot market helps to smooth income variations and minimize the 
liquidity problem for water rights.  For other types of transaction costs, both theory 
and empirical evidence support the hypothesis that transaction costs are not relevant 
for this study.  In general, water right buyers want to keep them for long periods 
minimizing the impact of transaction costs on farmer decisions, and on the price of 
water rights or the degree of market activity.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Hearne and Easter (1995) have estimated that the transaction costs associated with the 
purchase and sale of water rights in the Limarí Valley range from 5% to 2% of the 
price for buyers and sellers, respectively.  Although these costs do not appear to be 
high, problems arise when trade implies a change in the source of water because the 
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Direccion General de Aguas, a central governmental office, must approve the change 
of source, a process which may take several months because it must ensure that the 
petitioners meet certain requirements and evaluate possible negative externalities to 
other farmers.  The length of this process explains why most of the water rights 
transactions are among farmers who obtain their water from the same source.  
Secondly, the size (measured by the number of water rights exchanged) of each water 
right transaction28 is relatively small with little dispersion indicating that transaction 
costs are insignificant.  The following figure presents the frequency of the number of 
water rights trades in each one of the 778 transactions included in the dataset. 
                                                 
28 The database contains information for 778 transactions of water rights 
(independent of land transactions), in the four WUAs under study representing trade of 
11,910 water rights. 
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As the Figure 4.1 illustrates, most transactions involve small amounts of water 
rights, indicative of low transaction costs.  In fact, 50% of all transactions involve 6 
or fewer water rights, and 80% involve less than 20 while the mean value is 15 and 
the mode is equal to 2.  In dollar terms, a water right in 1999 had a minimum average 
price of US$ 927.40 (in ACER) and a maximum average price of US$ 2,766.4 (in 
ACEC).  If I use the mode (2 water rights per transaction) and the upper bound of the 
transaction cost estimated by Hearne and Easter (1995), i.e. 5% of the transaction 
price, I arrive at an estimate for transaction cost that ranges from a minimum of $46.4 
to a maximum of $138.32 U.S. dollars. 
Borrowing or liquidity constraints may explain outcomes in 
which 1 11
tE Mt t s vt t t
θ
θ
 + ≥ + − 
.  This implies that [ ]1 1s v E Mt t t t t tθ θ+ ≥+ + , i.e. the 
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marginal expected benefit of buying a water right  (the left hand side of the 
inequality) is greater than the marginal cost of buying a water right  (right hand side 
term of the inequality).  In such a case the farmer has an incentive to buy water rights 
and reduce his present consumption.  With decreasing marginal utility of 
consumption ( ( )U Ct′′ <0), that will reduce the stochastic discount factor, 1Mt+  
moving the inequality toward an equality.  But if the farmer faces liquidity or credit 
constraints then he may not be able to buy all the water rights he desires and the 
inequality may not vanish.  Accordingly to the Chilean Water Code, water rights are 
divorced from land.  As a consequence water rights are accepted as collateral by most 
banking institutions.  This allows farmers to obtain loans to buy water rights.  Thus, 
credit constraints are mainly for consumption.  The effect of this latter constraint is 
included in my model through the budget constraint for consumption.  
I also consider the impact of liquidity constraints on farmer savings decisions 
and risk aversion.  Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997), and Gollier (2001), among others, 
show that the risk of facing a liquidity constraint in the future introduces an important 
motive to save, since savings act as a buffer stock that reduces the probability that the 
liquidity constraint will be binding in the future.  Agents accumulate assets to insulate 
themselves from a temporary drop in income that cannot be compensated by short-
term debts.  Nevertheless, in the case under study farmers can smooth revenues from 
production by trading in the spot market for water.  
Now, if the inequality is such that [ ]1 1s v E Mt t t t t tθ θ+ ≤+ + , then the 
marginal expected cost of selling a water right  (the left hand side of the inequality) is 
less than the marginal benefit of selling a water right in period t (the right hand side 
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term of the inequality).  In this case the farmer wishes to sell water rights and increase 
his consumption.  A farmer without water rights is not able to do this leaving him at a 
corner solution where the inequality is strict.  From a theoretical point of view, such 
farmers may exist, so I review the data to see how many farmers in the sample have 
no water rights.  I find that only 5% of farmers had no water rights.   
4.4 Summary  
In this chapter, I have developed a framework that models a farmer’s optimal 
decision making in regards to investment in water rights and input quantities for each 
growing season.  This model is a consumption-based asset price model, and shows 
that a private farmer’s reservation value for a water right depends on the value of his 
stochastic discount factor.  Further analysis of that discount factor allows me to relate 
reservation values for water rights to the underlying preferences of farmers and risk 
aversion.  I have shown how heterogeneous preferences generate differences in the 
stochastic discount factor, which creates differences in farmers’ private reservation 
values for water rights and  helps to explain water rights transactions among farmers.  
Moreover, I show how more risk averse farmers have incentives to buy water rights 
from farmers with lesser risk aversion.  Lastly, I have discussed the effect of market 
frictions on the water rights market and on the validity of my model.  Among the 
frictions that the literature addresses, I have focused on transaction costs and 
borrowing constrains.  The analysis of the data for the case under study indicates that 
transaction costs do not affect the validity of the model and that the likelihood of a 
corner solution with a farmer holding zero water rights and with a reservation value 
less than water right market price is quite low.  Moreover, borrowing constraints 
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affect consumption decisions but not water right purchases because the rights can be 
used as collateral. 
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Chapter 5: The Econometric Estimation 
In this section, I develop an approach to jointly estimate the parameters that 
describe a farmer’s utility and production functions, based on observed economic 
behavior.  Joint estimation preserves estimation consistency and allows exploiting 
cross-equations error correlations that might improve efficiency (Love and Buccola, 
1991).  I also summarize the data sources and the main characteristics of the data that 
will be used in later estimations. 
5.1  Parametric specification of the system of equations  
The joint estimation of the parameters that describe a farmer’s utility and 
production functions is performed through the simultaneous estimation of the 
equation system described by the Euler Equation (4.2.10) and the first order 
conditions that solve for the optimal variable input quantities (4.2.17) and (4.2.18).  
That procedure requires a parametric specification of the instantaneous utility of 
consumption, the stochastic production technology and the variable that represents 
other net income, Iit . 
For the utility function, I have chosen an exponential function: 
( ) ( )expU C Ci i iγ= − −                         (5.1.1) 
where iγ is restricted to be non-negative.  The specification (5.1.1) has three main 
features.  First, the marginal utility of consumption is positive, 
( ) ( )expU C Ci i i iγ γ′ = − >0.  Second, the utility function is concave, 
( ) ( )2 expU C Ci i iiγ γ′′ = − − <0, which implies aversion to risk.  Third, it assumes that 
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the absolute Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient for each farmer, denoted by iRA , is 
constant (CARA) and equal to iγ , i.e.
iRA = iγ  
 The CARA preferences embodied in the use of the negative exponential utility 
function is a drawback of this specification because few decision-makers have the 
implied characteristic that their attitude towards risk remains the same regardless their 
wealth or asset position (Chavas, 2004, Chapter 4; Saha et al., 1994).  Nevertheless, 
risk preferences displaying constant risk aversion are extremely easy to deal with 
analytically (Hammond, 1974).  Moreover, the exponential function it is very suitable 
as a local approximation to anyone’s utility function for evaluating small to moderate 
gambles (Pratt, 1964).  For these reasons the CARA preferences have been widely 
used in applied decision analysis (Hammond, 1974, Keeney and Raffia, 1976, 
Gregory, 1978, Love and Buccola, 1991).  
To describe the stochastic production technology I use a Just-Pope Cobb- 
Douglas (Just and Pope, 1978) production function that facilitates the estimation of 
production risk endogenous to inputs.  Moreover, the Just-Pope form holds the best 
potential for mutual inference of preferences and technology (Love and Buccola, 
1991).  This function is: 
( ) ( ) 0 01 2 1 2, , ; , , ;y f w L F h w L F w L F w L Fit it itit it it it it it it it it it it itα βα α β βα β ε ε= + = +   
(5.1.2)  
where y is output per-hectare, w is water, L is labor, F is fertilizers (all inputs are 
divided by the number of cultivated hectares), ε  represents output uncertainty.  The 
vector of parameters of the non-stochastic component of the production function is 
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represented by ( ), ,1 2 3α α α α= , and ( ), ,1 2 3β β β β=  is the vector of parameters of 
the stochastic component of the production function.  Output uncertainty, itε , is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal with 
[ ] 0E itε = and [ ] 1V itε = 29.  Pope and Just (1977) point out that no generality is lost 
in assuming [ ] 1V itε = , since if [ ] 2V itε σε=  then the ( ), , ;h w L Fit it it β  could simply 
be modified by a multiplicative factor 2σε .  Moreover, as in Just and Pope (1977 and 
1979) and Love and Buccola (1991) I assume that 0 1 2 0E w L Ft itit it it
β β β ε  =  
.  That 
assumption implies that input quantities are either not stochastic or stochastic, but 
independent of ε .   
 Finally contemporaneous correlation among errors of the production function 
is not excluded i.e. , 0E it jtε ε  ≠   
From this production function specification, I obtain 
[ ] 31 2E y L w Fit it it it
αα α= and [ ]
2
31 2V y L w Fit it it it
ββ β = 
 
 
, which implies that the mean 
and variance of output are endogenous to input decisions. 
For the “other net income” variable, Iit , I assume the following linear model: 
                                                 
29 The equation system described by the Euler equation and the first order conditions 
that solve for the optimal variable input quantities are expressed in terms of conditional 
moments to the set of information in t.  However, because itε  is assumed to be i.i.d. its 
conditional and unconditional moments are the same (Cochrane, 2005, Chapter 1).  Thus, if I 
have that [ ] [ ] 0E Et it itε ε= =  I also can say that [ ] [ ] 01 1E Et it itε ε= =+ + . 
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( ) ( ) 31 21
*
31 2
N N s N v T w P T L w Fjt it it jt it jt it it it it it it itI ait it
P T L w F r X cit it it it it iit it it
αα αθ
ββ β ε




 ′− − 
     (5.1.3) 
where a is an unknown parameter, ci  is “normal” consumption, and itΓ  is a random 
error that represents random aggregate shocks plus idiosyncratic shocks different 
from production uncertainty that affect Iit .  
The variable Iit  represents farmer’s “other net income” sources as 
consumption and production credit, land transactions, livestock exchanges and work 
off-farm that can be used to afford consumption.  Equation (5.1.3) assumes that part 
of Iit  is endogenous and depends on the differences between net income from 
production and water trading and some “normal” consumption level, ci , that is 
farmer specific.  For instance, a farmer that owns livestock and who faces a situation 
in which her net production revenues plus water trading income is lesser than ci  may 
sell cattle. 
Equation (5.1.3) also states that Iit  is a function of the deterministic part of 
the net income, ( ) ( ) 31 21N N s N v T w P T L w F r Xjt it it jt it jt it it it it it itit it itαα αθ ′− + − + −− , 
and two stochastic components: (1) farmer’s output specific or idiosyncratic random 
shocks, 31 2P T L w Fit it itit it it
ββ β ε , and (2) the random term itΓ .  
I assume that output specific random shocks, itε , and itΓ  are distributed 
independently.  That assumption follows from the fact that itε  represents output 
uncertainty, for instance pests, while itΓ  represents uncertainty over “other net 
 
 78  
income sources” such as random variations in bank interest rates.  If asset markets 
were complete then farmers’ specific random shocks would be aggregate temporal 
shocks and the assumption of independent distributions may not be valid any more.  
Nevertheless, because in the case under study asset markets are incomplete the above 
independence assumption should hold.  
Incomplete asset markets may also imply heterogeneous variances for Iit  
among farmers.  Different investment decisions of a surplus between “normal” 
consumption level, ci , and production and water trading incomes may lead to 
different variances in Iit .  Whether or not a farmer faces credit constraints may also 
affect the variance of Iit .  These differences in the variance of Iit  among farmers 
lead me to assume that itΓ  is heteroskedastic.  Thus I assume that itΓ distributes 
normal with conditional expected mean zero and non constant conditional 
variance 2iσ Γ .  
Replacing the Euler Equation (4.2.10) with these structural forms, I get: 
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A convenient expression for the second term in the right hand of (5.1.5) can be obtained with the Jensen’s 
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where 1+itϕ  is a positive expression that corresponds to a Jensen’s inequality 
adjustment.  The economic intuition for the adjustment can be seen by noticing that 
(using notation of Chapter 4) 1+itϕ = ln ln1 1 1 1E M E Mt it jt t it jtθ θ   −+ + + +    ,  
where the difference on the right hand side of the  expression is a measure of 
conditional volatility of  the discounted water right price for each farmer (Alvarez and 
Jermann, 2005).  As a special case, if the discounted price is distributed lognormal, 
then the volatility measure 1+itϕ = 12  ( )ln 11Var M jtt it θ ++   (Campbell et al. 
(1997, Chapter 8). 
 Substituting the right hand term of equation (5.1.6) in the Euler Equation 
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    Because 31 2 01 1 11 1 1E P T L W Ft it it itit it it
ββ β ε  =+ + + + + + 
 and [ ] 01Et itΓ =+ , equation 
(5.1.7) simplifies to:30   
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 (5.1.8) 
 
Equations (4.2.3), (5.1.2) and (5.1.3) imply that the second term of the right 
hand side of equation (5.1.8) represents the expectation in t of the expected 
consumption in t+1 conditional to the information in that same period, i.e. 
                                                 
30 I have assumed that input quantities are not stochastic in the current period or 
stochastically independent fromε , i.e. 31 2 0E P T L W Ft it it itit it it
ββ β ε  =  
.  Now, to explore the 
value of 31 21 1 11 1 1E P T L W Ft it it itit it it
ββ β ε + + + + + + 
 I use that assumption and the law of 
iterated expectations to obtain:  
3 31 2 1 21 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1E P T L W F E E P T L W Ft it it it t t it it itit it it it it it
β ββ β β βε ε    =+ + + + + + +    + + + + + +    
= 
[ ]31 21 1 1 1 11 1 1E E P T L W F Et t it it t itit it it
ββ β ε   =+ + + + +  + + +  
31 2 0 01 1 1 1 1 1E E P T L W Ft t it it it it it
ββ β   =+ + +  + + +  
. 
The result [ ] 01Et itΓ =+  follows from the law of iterated expectations and the 
assumption that [ ] 01 1Et itΓ =+ + .  In fact the law of iterated expectations implies that 
[ ] [ ]1 1 1E E Et it t t it Γ = Γ+ + +  , and [ ] 01 1Et itΓ =+ +  implies [ ] 01 1E Et t it Γ =+ +  . 
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[ ]1 1E E Ct t it + +  31.  I then write that expression in a more conventional time-series 
notation as [ ]1 1 1 1E E C Ct t it it itξ  = ++ + + +  , where 1itξ +  is random error with 
conditional expectation equal to 0 (Cochrane, 2005, Chapter 9). 
Assuming [ ] 01Et itξ =+  implies that the unconditional mean [ ] 01E itξ =+  
and that 1itξ +  is not correlated with the information set at time t (Wooldridge, 2002, 
Chapter 2.2.3).  Thus, the proposed transformation presumes that, based on the set of 
information in period t, farmers can predict part of random consumption in t+1, but 
there is another part of future consumption represented by 1itξ +  that can not be 
predicted because is not related with the set of information at time t.   
An identical argument can be used to transform the expectation of the natural 
log of the price of a water right in the right hand side of equation (5.1.8) as: 
ln ln1 1 1 1E Et t jt jt jtθ θ ζ   = ++ + + +   .  As in the case of the transformation for 
consumption and for the same reasons that I have indicated above I assume 
that 01E jtt
ζ  =+  . 
Substituting these transformations, [ ]1 1 1 1E E C Ct t it it itξ  = ++ + + +   and 
ln ln1 1 1 1E Et t jt jt jtθ θ ζ   = ++ + + +   , in equation (5.1.8) gives: 
 
                                                 
31 Because production uncertainty realized its value at the end of the season, 
consumption in t+1 is not known until the end of that season.  Thus, in t+1 the farmer only 
has an expectation of his consumption level for that season. 
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In equation (5.1.9) the term aci  cancels out. Then, reordering terms, equation 
(5.1.9) can be written as:  
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where 1 1 1 1 1it it it jtυ φ ξ ζ≡ + ++ + + +  is a composite error with 
[ ] [ ]1 1 1E Et it t itυ φ=+ + .   
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The structural forms proposed in equations (5.1.1), (5.1.2) and (5.1.3) implies 
that the first order conditions for optimal quantities of water, labor and fertilizer, 
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              (5.1.13) 
In the above equations the price for labor is denoted by 1r , and for fertilizer by 2r .  
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Using the already mentioned distributional assumptions for itε  and itΓ , and 
the assumption of distributional independence between 31 2P T L W Fit it itit it it
ββ β ε   
and 
itΓ  (discussed above), plus the properties of the moment generating functions of the 
normal distributed variables itε and itΓ
32, the system of equation (5.1.10) to (5.1.13) 
simplifies to: 
The Euler Equation: 
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( )
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32 For a random variable X distributed normal with mean µ  and variance 2σ  the 
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The equations for the optimal variable input quantities: 
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(5.1.17) 
 
Those first order conditions indicate that input decisions depend on the 
marginal productivity of inputs, input prices, risk aversion and the effect of each input 
on the variance of output.  The last two effects on optimal input quantities are 
captured by the second term within brackets in each of those equations.  Given that 
iγ is positive, that term is negative (positive) for risk decreasing (increasing) inputs.  
Thus for a risk-averse farmer, when an input is risk decreasing (increasing), he has an 
incentive to increase (decrease) the demand for this input.   
It is important to notice that in equations (5.1.14) to (5.1.17) if the parameter a 
is equal to -1, then risk aversion does not affect farmer decisions on either water 
rights or input quantities.  As it can be seen from equations (4.2.3) and (5.1.13) a 
value of -1 for a implies that the farmer’s expected consumption in any season is 
equal to his “normal” consumption level.  Moreover, with a = -1 farmer’s 
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consumption is not affected by random shocks in production, i.e. C cit i it= + Γ .  This 
implies that the farmer has production full insurance or unlimited access to “other 
income sources” such as credits.  Nevertheless, because neither production full 
neither insurance nor unlimited access to “other income sources are feasible I rule out 
the possibility of a = -1. 
As in Love and Buccola (1991), Saha et al. (1994), Chavas an Holt (1996) and 
Kumbhakar (2002), among others, I added to equations (5.1.15), (5.1.16) and (5.1.17) 
the additive disturbances, ,  ,  2 3 4it it itυ υ υ , associated with errors in optimization.  
Pope and Just (2003) find credible evidence in U.S. agricultural production of errors 
in optimization.  I assume that these optimization mistakes occur in form of random 
failures, which support a stochastic structure to the equation system.  That stochastic 
structure is needed to achieve an econometric estimation of the parameters of interest.  
In addition, I assume that these itυ ′ s have conditional expected value equal to zero.  I 
do not restrict the error terms of the first order condition for input quantities to be 
independent among equations for each farmer.  Only the error term of the Euler 
Equation, 1 1itυ + , is assumed to be independent of the error terms ,  ,  2 3 4it it itυ υ υ .  
This assumption about the independence of the error term of the Euler Equation with 
respect to the error terms of the input equations is based on the structure of 1 1itυ + .  
That structure indicates that 1 1itυ +  is a function of the random variable 1itξ +  that 
realizes its value in t+1 and which I expect not to be correlated with errors in 
optimization for input quantities in period t.   
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I also assume that disturbances are correlated across farmers within equations. 
Therefore, [ ], 0Covt hit hmtυ υ ≠ for i m≠  and for h=1,2,3,4.  I only exclude 
correlations between errors associated with different farmers and across equations. 
Given these assumptions regarding the error terms, ( ), ,1 2 3υ υ υ υ= , the 
variance- covariance matrix of υ , which is denoted by Ω  is specified as follows: 
Ω = ( )Et υυ′ =
0 0 011 * * *
0 * 22 23 * 24 *
0 * 32 * 33 34 *
0 * 42 * 43 * 44
I I IN N N N N N
I I IN N N N N N
I I IN N N N N N









Here Ω is a matrix of order N*H x N*H with N the number of farmers, H the number 
of equations, [ ]Ehh t h hυ υ′Σ =  and ( ),gh Cov git hittσ υ υ= , for g=2,3,4 and h=2,3,4.  
5.2   Data  
The data set has two parts and contains data for the four main WUAs 
associations in the Limarí Valley33. The first part contains a cross-section time series 
sample on farmers over two agricultural seasons (98/99 and 99/00).  It includes micro 
level data for farming activity.  The second part of the data contains time series for: i) 
water right prices and water right transactions for the period 1981 to 2001; ii) spot 
market water prices and water transactions for the period 1995 to 2000; and iii) water 
accorded to water rights for the period 1980 to 2000. 
The farmer micro-level data is obtained from a two-round survey that I 
conducted.  This survey was performed in the Limarí Valley (see the survey 
                                                 
33 Those WUAs are: Asociación de Canalistas del Canal Camarico (ACCC); 
Asociación de analistas del Embalse Cogotí (ACEC); Junta de Vigilancia del Río Limarí 
(JVRL); and Asociación de Canalistas del Embalse Recoleta (ACER).  
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instrument in the Annex).  Farmers from the main irrigated areas within this key 
agricultural region were interviewed.  The sample was designed by Zegarra (2002)34 
who conducted a previous survey on that same valley.  In the first round (SI), 
surveyed in 1999, I collected information for the 98/99 season from 161 farmers.  The 
second round (SII) was conducted in 2000 and I collected information for the 99/00 
season from 151 farmers. 
The farm level data set includes seasonal information on crop production, 
input use for each crop, output and input prices, irrigation methods, water right 
transactions, volume of water bought or sold in the spot market, land transactions, 
livestock inventory, renting in or out of machinery, asset ownership, farmer’s 
liabilities, household characteristics, family labor, well access and water storage 
capacity, marketing, governmental subsidies to improve irrigation systems and water 
expectations for the coming season.  
As is usual in surveys that collect data, I have gaps in the data due to attrition 
and survey non-response.  Balgati (2001) presents the rate of attrition for a sample of 
studies that use panel data.  In my sample, attrition from the first to the second round 
surveys that I conducted is comparable to that obtained in other empirical works.  
Non-response is caused by farmers that have sold or have decided to abandon their 
land, farmers previously interviewed that were not subsequently located and farmers 
                                                 
34 Zegarra did not develop a list of farmers to interview based on a random sample 
due to the expense of finding each sampled individual; instead, he simulated random 
sampling for farmers who were present at their farm when he conducted the survey.  He 
began at some point inside the irrigated area (stratum), interviewing farmers using a 
systematic round skipping for close neighbors.  This results in a sample, which is 
geographically representative for each irrigation organization.  The main limitation of this 
sampling procedure is that farmers who were not present at the moment of the survey had 
zero probability of being selected.  The procedure also excludes farmers who, at the moment 
of the survey, had abandoned production. 
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who refused to answer (7 and 4 farmers in the first and second rounds refused to 
answer, respectively).  The causes of non-response suggest few if any behavioral 
reasons behind this problem; hence, the consequences of attrition appear to be 
minimal.   
There is missing data arising from partial response to survey questions.  This 
is mainly due to the fact that most farmers do not keep written records of the 
information requested in the survey.  In fact, only five among all surveyed farmers 
had written records on most of the surveyed data.  Thus, in most cases, a partial 
response occurs when the respondent fails to answer a question because he has 
difficulty recalling events that occurred in the past. 
One way to handle the missing data problem is by imputing missing 
observations.  Nevertheless, as Cameron and Trivedi (2005) point out “there is a cost 
of imputing missing data that comes from having to make assumptions to support a 
procedure for generating proxies for the missing observations, and from the 
approximation error inherent in such a procedure.” 
Alternatively, it is possible to handle missing data by deleting them and 
analyze only the reduced sample of “complete” observations.  That procedure is 
called listwise deletion.  Its consequences for the econometric estimation depend on 
the missing data mechanism.  If the probability of missing data of the variables in the 
data set depends neither on its own values nor on the values of other variables in the 
data set, then missing data process is completely at random.  In that case the 
remaining set after listwise deletion remains a random sample from the original 
population and the estimates based on it are consistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
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If the probability of missing data on a variable does not depend on its value but may 
depend on the values of other variables in the data set, then data is missing at random.  
If the data set has gaps due to data missing at random and the parameters for the 
missing data-generation process are unrelated to the parameters that one wants to 
estimate, then the missing data problem is ignorable and the complete data set after 
listwise deletion allows for consistent estimation of the parameters of interest 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  Nonetheless, under either the missing data complete at 
random or just missing data at random assumptions, listwise deletion still reduces 
efficiency in the estimation.   
For the case of the missing data problem in my survey, the causes of non-
response suggest few if any behavioral reasons behind this problem.  Furthermore, 
missing data due to a partial response to survey questions is mainly related to the 
difficulty of some farmers to recall past data.  Thus, it seems reasonable to assume 
my data set is characterized by missing data complete at random or at least missing at 
random.  Therefore I handle the missing data problem using listwise deletion. 
The Euler Equation (5.1.14) links farmers’ decisions in two seasons.  This 
requires full data for each farmer in the two seasons under study.  That requirement 
causes substantial sample loss and after the listwise deletion process the number of 
farmers that fulfill that requirement is 32. 
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The following table provides some statistics on the most important variables in the model for the whole sample as 
well as for sub-sample of 32 farmers used in this dissertation (referred to in what follows as the sub-sample). 
   Table 5.1: Basic statistics of the main variables  
 Whole sample Sub-sample (3 2 farmers) 
Variable SI 
 
SII SI SII 












Cultivated land (hectare) 161 12.1 25.2 148 10.3 17.9 12 21.3 11.4 18.5 
Labor (hours per hectare) 148 1242 2115 137 1021 1674 1099 1437 987 1201 
Nitrogen (kilograms per 




137 109.8 151.5 320 591 125.7 170.9 
Input water (cubic meters 
per hectare) 144 15766 20763 132 9145 9997 6958 5129 8674 16081 
Number of water rights 155 20.7 37 141 20.2 36 15.6 14.7 17.3 19.0 
Education (years of 
schooling) 151 8.3 4.7 139 8.0 4.7 8.6 4.7 8.7 4.6 
Experience (years) 134 30.4 14.3 118 25.6 13.0 28.6 14.3 30.5 13.6 
Household size 131 4.7 3.3 102 4.8 3.2 4.9 3.6 4.9 3.0 
Percentage of  multioutput 
producers 53.7% 52.11% 31.3% 34.3% 
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Table 5.1 shows that sample mean values from the whole samples are close to 
the sample mean values from the sub-samples for all the reported variables but input 
water per hectare in survey I.  The percentages of multioutput producers in the sub-
samples are lower than in the whole sample.  If farmers’ decisions on the number of 
crops they grow are related to their risk aversion, then differences in the percentage of 
multioutput producers may cause a bias problem.  That may be the case if an 
estimation of risk aversion for a “representative farmer” is intended with the sub-
samples.  In this dissertation I test for differences in risk aversion among farmers.  As 
I explain in next chapter, that test is based on the effect of farmer’s specific 
characteristics upon his risk aversion and, as a consequence, it is not subject to the 
above mentioned bias problem. 
Annual average price for water rights and water right transaction time series 
for the period 1981 to 2001 were obtained through the Conservador de Bienes Raíces 
of Ovalle and the records kept by the WUAs35.  Water prices and water transactions 
in the spot market time series for the period 1995 to 2000 were constructed using the 
records of the WUAs, information obtained from the Direccion de Riego and the two-
round survey.  For water accorded to water rights I use data from the WUAs. 
In the equation system (5.1.14) to (5.1.17), the land input is measured as the 
total hectares of cultivated land.  No distinction is made as to whether land is owned, 
rented or sharecropped36.   
                                                 
35 The series for water right prices and transactions between 1981 and 1992 were 
collected by Zegarra (2002) and between 1992 and 2000 by Cristi et al. (2002) and Vicuña 
(2000).  
36 Sharecroppers were considered as single producers. 
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Production input water is measured as the farmer’s total number of water 
rights times the amount of water accorded to each right plus net sales of water 
volumes37.  The amount of water obtained through that formula was weighted by 
farmer’s average irrigation efficiency38.  
 Labor is total hours per growing season and is obtained by grouping together 
three different types of labor: family workers, permanent hired workers, and hired 
workers for specific activities (temporary workers).  The survey data show that some 
farmers only use family work, others have permanent hired workers and others hire 
workers for specific activities and time periods (temporary workers).  For those 
farmers with a mix of workers it is not possible to infer from the available data how 
many hours worked correspond to each type of worker. Thus I restrict my 
econometric results by making no distinction among type of workers.   
Fertilizer is measured in kilograms of nitrogen.  
                                                 
37 Farmers may decide not to use all the water accorded to their water rights, but 
saving water from one season to the next has a penalty of 15% to 20% of the endowment 
which makes this practice rare (Zegarra 2002).  Moreover, the existence of a price greater 
than zero for water in the spot market implies that rational farmers will not resign to any 
amount of water accorded to their water rights.  
38 Because irrigation systems vary among land plots within the same farm I use 
farmer’s average irrigation efficiency.  This was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the 
farmer’s irrigation efficiency in his different plots within the same farm:  
 
( )    
1
  










Drip Sprinkler Furrow Flood 
 90% 75% 65% 45% 
   Source: Comisión  Nacional de Riego, Gobierno de Chile 
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Some farmers in the sample produce more than one crop.  For those farmers I 
represent output price by a farmer-specific weighted average of all the farmgate 
prices of the farmer’s crops.  As in Saha et al. (1994) I use the product specific 
income shares as weights for each crop price.  Furthermore, because prices depend on 
the arbitrary output units they value39 I have divided each farmgate price by is sample 
mean40.  This scaling procedure does not affect the relations that I intend to estimate 
econometrically with my model. 
For wages paid to labor, 1r , I use the per hour payments to temporary workers.  
Those payments are a good proxy of the labor price that each farmer faces on the 
labor market.  I also estimate total labor cost by multiplying wages by total hours 
worked.  That procedure values the work of permanent hired workers and family 
workers as equal with the work done by temporary workers.  Three farmers in the 
sample do not hire temporal workers.  For them, I use the daily payment to their 
permanent workers as the wage rate.  Finally, three other farmers use only unpaid 
family workers so I use the sample average of the per hour payments to temporary 
                                                 
39 As an example, potatoes can be measured in kilograms and there is a price for the 
kilogram of potatoes.  Nevertheless, potatoes are also exchanged in sack units of 50 
kilograms and the price of a sack is higher than the price for a kilogram. In the estimation of 
an average price the price of potatoes will be given more weight if I arbitrarily use the price 
of a sack of potatoes.  This problem can be eliminated by dividing potato prices by their 
sample mean.  The sample mean for the price of each crop has to be calculated over farmgate 
prices that value identical units of that crop.   
 
40 The sample average price of crop k in season t, pkt , is calculated as: 
nk
p p nkt kit k
i
= 	  where pkit  is the farmgate price of crop k for farmer i in period t, and 
nk  is the total number of surveyed farmers that produce crop k in season t.  
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workers as proxy of their labor cost.  Here I am assuming that family workers can at 
least get the average wages for temporary workers by working off-farm. 
 The nitrogen price aggregate, 2r , is computed as an arithmetic mean using 
expenditure shares as the weights.  Different nitrogen prices are obtained by dividing 




                (5.2.1) 
where PFfit  is the unit price of fertilizer f paid by farmer i in period t and UN f  
equals kilograms of nitrogen contained in one unit of fertilizer f.  In the sample data 
there is one farmer that reports a value of zero for nitrogen.  Because the underlying 
assumption of this dissertation is that observed farmers decisions are optimal, I take 
that amount of nitrogen as the farmer’s optimal decision for the quantity of that input.  
The nitrogen price for this observation is set at the arithmetic sample average of 
nitrogen prices.  The underlying assumption is that the farmer can do as well as the 
average farmer in buying fertilizer input. 
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Chapter 6: Estimation and results  
 The estimation of the parameters ,  ,  aρ γ and the parameter vectors ,  α β , Ω  
is based on Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) assuming a multivariate 
normal distribution in the residuals of the system of equations.  The likelihood of the 
sample is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11, , , , , 2 exp , , , , , , , , )2 2 2
NT
L a Z F Z F Z Jtγ α β ρ π ρ γ α β ρ γ α β
− ′− −Ω = Ω − Ω  
(6.1) 
where Z=(Z1,Z2) is the vector of variables in the model.  Z1 is the set of endogenous 
variables in the model, i.e. Z1 = ( ), ,N w X .  Z2 represent the set of exogenous 
variables, i.e. 
, , , , , , , , , , , ,1, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 , 2 1 1,
2 , ,1 1 1, 1
s s v v P P T T r r r r wjt jt jt jt jt jt it it it it i t i t i t i t it
Z
L F N Nit it it it




 + + − +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ρ γ α β ∂
≡  ∂ 
 is the Jacobian of the transformation from υ  to Z1. 
Consistent estimation of the system of equations (5.1.14) to (5.1.18) requires 
that the exogenous variables in the model are not correlated with the error term of the 
Euler Equation, 1 1 1 1 1it it it jtυ φ ξ ζ≡ + ++ + + + .  Nevertheless, because that error term 
contains an omitted variable, 1itφ + , some of the regressors may be correlated with 
1 1itυ + .  If so, the explanatory variables that are correlated with 1 1itυ +  are 
endogenous (Kapetanios, 2004).  Hence, I need to test for endogeneity of the 
regressors in the Euler Equation.  For that purpose I use a test proposed by Hausman 
(1978), which I describe in detail in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.  Also I 
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test whether the conditional mean of the error term in the Euler Equation is zero, i.e. 
01 1 2E Zitυ  =+  .  The latter test procedure is as follows.  First I obtain the FIML 
estimated residuals for the Euler Equation.  Then I estimate a linear regression of 
those errors on a constant.  If the constant is not statistically significant I do no reject 
the hypothesis of a conditional mean value of zero for the error terms in the Euler 
Equation.   
Due to the lack of a longitudinal data, the estimation of the parameter for 
preferences, iγ , for each farmer is addressed by assuming that his utility function is 
based on known farmer characteristics (Zeldes, 1989, Blundell et al., 1994, Dubois, 
2001).  Thus, the parameter that represents a farmer’s preferences is parameterized as 
an exponential function of that farmer’s education (ED), experience (EXP) and 
household size (HS) 
 iγ  = ( )exp 0 1 2 3ED EXP HSi i iγ γ γ γ+ + +                                                    (6.2) 
where ,  ,  ,  0 1 2 3γ γ γ γ  are unknown parameters.  The exponential form ensures that 
iγ  is positive.  Hence, the right hand side of (6.2) replaces iγ  in the system of 
equations (5.1.14) to (5.1.18).   
For the variance of the random error itΓ  in the equation for the variable Iit , 
equation (5.1.3), I propose the following specification: 
( )2 1 2exp 0 D Dici il
δ δσ δ=Γ                 (6.3) 
where ,  ,  0 1 2δ δ δ  are unknown parameters, and Dil  and Dic  are dummy variables 
that indicate whether the farmer has livestock and whether the farmer has access to 
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consumption or production credit, respectively41.  The exponential form for the 
constant 0δ  ensures that the variance of itΓ  is positive. 
Sample data indicates that a good number of farmers invest in livestock and 
that cattle are sold and bought quiet often by the farmers, probably to mitigate 
consumption volatility (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).  The investment decision in 
livestock should affect the variance of Iit because asset returns do not have the same 
variances in a real situation.  Moreover, farmers without credit restrictions can 
experience higher changes in Iit because when it is needed they can substitute for 
present net income from production and water transactions with market loans.  
Furthermore, for those farmers, when income is greater than their “normal” 
consumption levels they probably devote an important part of that difference to pay 
their debts.  Additionally, farmers with access to credit can face riskier activities and 
therefore higher expected incomes precisely because they can solve consumption 
smoothing through indebtedness.  As a consequence, it is expected that farmers 
without credit restrictions exhibit a higher variance in Iit.   
That structure for the variance of itΓ  also allows me to control for the effect 
of two main other income sources (credits and sales of cattle) when choosing optimal 
decisions for consumption smoothing.  In the present context of incomplete markets, 
farmers maintain water rights not only for production but also for consumption 
smoothing and this justifies the necessity for controlling from other income sources. 
                                                 
41 The variable Dil  takes the value of 2 if farmers have livestock and the value of 1 
other wise.  In the case of Dic  it takes the value of 2 if farmers have access to credit and the 
value of one other wise.  I have used the value of 1 and 2 instead of 0 and 1 to allow 
convergence in the estimation procedure.  
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This allows me to better explain within my model, decisions upon the number of 
water rights held by a farmer. 
In the construction of the dummy variable for credit, those farmers that have 
received a credit in any of the agricultural seasons that go from the 95-96 to 99-00 
seasons where classified as farmers with access to credit, otherwise they were labeled 
as farmers without access to credit.  
The parameter a in equation (5.1.3), the parameter  0δ  in equation (6.3), as 
well as the constants terms of the Just-Pope production function are not separately 
identifiable from the parameter 0γ  in the equation system (5.1.14) to (5.1.17).  The 
latter is the constant term in the specification for risk aversion in equation (6.2).  Thus 
the equation (5.1.14) should be written as: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
ln ln ln 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
exp 0 1 2 3
31 21 1 1 11 1 1
1
exp 0 1 2 3
s vjt jt jt jt
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a ED EXP HSi i i
P T L W F r Xit it it itit it it
N Njt it it
a ED EXP HS si i i j
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γ γ γ γ αα α
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γ γ γ γ
− = + −+
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                             (6.4) 
where ( ) ( )exp 1a a= + .  Thus I estimate the parameters ln ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  0 1 2 3 0ρ γ γ γ γ γ   
plus the parameter vectors α  and β .  With 0γ = 0 aγ +   and 20 0 0γ γ δ= + .  In the 
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input equations I also estimate 0γ  instead of 0γ .  As a consequence, I can not 
estimate a specific value for the coefficient of risk aversion.  Nevertheless, in spite of 
the identification problem of 0γ , I can still test whether risk aversion is 
heterogeneous among farmers.   
FIML procedure requires an initial value for each of the parameters of the 
system.  Love and Buccola (1991) and Saha et al. (1994) estimate farmers’ 
preferences and production technology jointly in the presence of risk.  They estimate 
parameters for preferences and production technology from the first order conditions 
of the maximization of the expect utility with respect to inputs.  In both studies, 
starting values for the production function parameters are provided by a prior 
estimation of the Just-Pope production function.  Nevertheless, if inputs are 
endogenous, they should be correlated with the error term in the production function.  
The Just-Pope parameter estimates are then inconsistent (Love and Buccola, 1991).  
Due to that problem with the estimation of the Just-Pope production function, I have 
chosen to obtain starting values for the production function parameters from a prior 
estimation of the input demand system in my model.  The estimates from those 
equations provide the set of starting values for a new estimation of the whole system, 
i.e. the input equations together with the Euler Equation.  
For the constant discount factor, ρ , I use as a starting value the reciprocal of 
one plus the market annual interest rate on year 1998.  For the constant in the 
equation for the variance of itΓ  (equation (6.3)) I use a value of zero as starting value 
and a value of one for the parameters of livestock and credit.   
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 Data used in the estimation presents large differences in the scale of the 
variables.  Therefore, I have re-scaled the values of the variables dividing each 
variable by its sample standard deviation (with the only exception of dummy 
variables of the equation (6.3)).  Scaling the data facilitates convergence of the 
estimation and does not affect the measurement of the underlying relationship among 
the variables in the model neither the t-statistics, but it does affect the interpretation 
of the parameter estimates (Carter et al., 1997, Chapter 6).  The latter is not a problem 
for the analysis developed in this dissertation that focus on the significance and the 
sign of the parameter estimates rather than on their numerical values.  Finally, a 
constant term was added to each input equation in order to ensure a zero mean value 
for the error terms.  
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation of the system 
of equations are reported in Table 6.1. 
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variables are in 
Chilean pesos of 
year 1990) 
Variable 
description Max Min Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Number of water 
shares (96-97) Units 65.5 0.25 18.2 17.5 
Number of water 
shares (97-98) Units 65 0.0 17.8 17.9 
Number of water 
shares (98-99) Units 65 0.25 15.6 14.7 
Number of water 
shares (99-00) Units 80 0.0 17.3 19 
Water accorded to 
water rights  (97-98) Cubic meters 6633 5000 6039 526.0 
Water accorded to 
water rights  (98-99) Cubic meters 6633 3000 4933 1193 
Water accorded to 
water rights  (99-00) Cubic meters 6633 3000 4969 1227 
Education (98-99) Years of schooling 17 1 8.6 4.7 
Experience (98-99) Years 50 1 28.6 14.3 
Household size  
(98-99) 
Number of  
people leaving in 
the same house 
18 1 4.9 3.6 
Education (99-00) Years of schooling 17 2 8.7 4.6 
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variables are in 
Chilean pesos of 
year 1990) 
Variable 
description Max Min Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Experience  (99-00) Years 51 10 30.5 13.6 
Household size  
(99-00) 
Number of  people 
leaving in the same 
house 
15 1 4.9 3.0 
Land (98-99) Total cultivated land 116 0.2 12 21.3 
Labor (98-99) 
Total number of 
hours on the season 
per cultivated 
hectare 
7400 15.36 1099 1437 
Fertilizers (98-99) Kg. of nitrogen  per cultivated hectare 2818 0.00 320 591 
Water used as input 
by the farmer (98-99) 
Cubic meters per 
cultivated hectare 18720 1485 6958 5129 
Land (99-00) Total cultivated  Land 90 0.12 11.4 18.5 
Labor (99-00) 
Total number of 
hours on the season 
per cultivated 
hectare 
4533.3 8.5 987 1201 
Fertilizers (99-00) Kg. of nitrogen  per cultivated hectare 816.7 0.0 125.7 171 
Water used as input 
by the farmer (99-00) 
Cubic meters per 
cultivated hectare 93750 1782 8674 16081 
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variables are in 
Chilean pesos of 
year 1990) 
Variable 
description Max Min Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Labor price (98-99) Chilean pesos 7800 2750 4238.8 919.7 
      
Fertilizer price (98-
99 ) Chilean pesos 2717 51.9 985.5 686.7 
Water price in the 
spot market (98-99) Chilean pesos 12.52 6.77 8.93 2.34 
Labor price (99-00) Chilean pesos 5500 3250 4107.2 664.4 
Fertilizer price (99-
00 ) Chilean pesos 6512.9 157.7 1133.6 1141.3 
Water price in the 
spot market (99-00) Chilean pesos 9.72 2.11 6.61 2.65 
    Water right prices 
            (97-98) Chilean pesos 456876 176775 286788 106160 
Water right prices 
(98-99) Chilean pesos 554981 172496 361797 155830 
    Water right prices 
           (99-00) Chilean pesos 588887 197404 332714 131889 
Output price index  
(98-99) Chilean pesos 3.72 0.29 1 0.87 
Output price index  
(99-00) Chilean pesos 5.14 0.35 1.16 1.28 
Labor cost (98-99) Chilean pesos 31256007 15726 2010805 5434032 
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variables are in 
Chilean pesos of 
year 1990) 
Variable 




99)  Chilean pesos 10641458 16163 665187 1860068 
Labor cost (99-00) Chilean pesos 42203503 12555 2314106 7486319 
Fertilizer cost (99-
00)  Chilean pesos 3132494 0.0 325774 645616 
Gross output 
revenue per hectare 
(98-99) 
Chilean pesos 13255140 47324 1759103 2675375 
Gross output 
revenue per hectare 
(99-00) 





I specify the variance-covariance matrix allowing different variances for the 
disturbances of each equation and contemporaneous correlation among the 
disturbances of the input first order conditions corresponding to the same farmer.  
Heteroskedasticity for the errors of the Euler Equation is expected because they are 
defined as 1 1 1 1 1it it it tυ φ ξ ζ≡ + ++ + + + , and it is reasonable to expect that the 
[ ]1Vart itφ + , i.e. the variance of the conditional volatility of the discounted water 
right price for each farmer, differs among farmers.  Nevertheless, the correlogram of 
the square residuals, the conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test and the Cusum 
squares test indicate that the null hypothesis of homokedastic error terms of the Euler 
Equation cannot be rejected.  The same result is obtained for the error terms of the 
input equations for water and fertilizer.  In the case of the errors of the labor equation, 
only the Cusum squares test does reject that hypothesis.   
To test for correlation among errors corresponding to different farmers within 
the same equation, I use the Ljung-Box Q-statistic which is commonly used to test 
whether the disturbances are white noise.  Based on this test I do not reject the 
hypothesis that the errors are not correlated. 
The resulting variance-covariance matrix can be summarized by: 
( )Et υυ′Ω = =
0 0 011 * * * *
0 * 22 * 23 * 24 *
0 * 32 * 33 * 34 *
0 * 42 * 43 * 44 *
I I I IN T N T N T N T
I IN T N T I IN T N T
I I IN T N T N T N T
















gh gi hiN i
σ υ υ= 	
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 Residuals ˆgiυ  and ˆhiυ  are the maximum likelihood estimated residuals in each 
iteration.   
Efficient estimation of the Euler Equation is required for the Hausman test in 
that equation (Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 6.2.1).  Because I ensure an efficient 
estimation of that Equation with the above mentioned specification of the variance-
covariance matrix, I can use the Hausman test for possible endogeneity of some of the 
regressors due to an omitted variables problem in the Euler Equation.  Result of the 
test indicates that I can not reject the null hypothesis that those variables are 
individually and jointly exogenous.  This provides evidence that the parameters of the 
model are estimated consistently and that they are unbiased.  In fact a maximum 
likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the variables are jointly exogenous 
gives a value equal to 1.70 which is lower than the critical value of 12.8 for a Chi-
Squared with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance level of 5%.  Moreover, the test 
for the conditional mean of the error terms in each equation indicates that I can not 
reject the hypothesis that the residuals have conditional mean equal to zero.  This 
result for the Euler Equation is fully consistent with the above result of the Hausman 
test, because 01 2E Zhitυ  =+   implies [ ] 01 2E Zhitυ =+ . 
A Jarque-Bera test for normality of the errors shows that I cannot reject the 
null of normality for the residuals of each of the equations within the system but the 
equation that describes first order condition for labor.  
 Parameter estimates are shown in Table 6.2.  Results indicate that all the 




household size and the dummy variable that indicate whether the farmer has livestock 
are not statistically significant.   




Estimates of the deterministic part of the production function  
( vectorα ) 
 
Water inputs per hectare 0.86 
(0.10) 
 
Labor per hectare 2.43 
(0.08) 
 
Fertilizer use per hectare 0.44 
(0.03) 
 
Estimates of the stochastic part of the production function (vector β ) 
Parameters  
 
Water inputs per hectare 2.28 
(0.13) 
 
Labor per hectare 0.04 
(0.01) 
 
Fertilizer use per hectare 0.15 
(0.02) 
 
Estimates of the parameters for the equation for farmers preferences 
(vector γ )  






Family Size -0.12 
(0.08) 
Estimates of the parameters for the variance of itΓ  (vectorδ )  






Cont. Table 6.2: Estimates of the parameters of the equation system using FIML 
Livestock ( Dl ) -0.44 
(7.44) 
Credit ( Dc ) 7.77 
(1.22) 
Estimates of other parameters  
Discount factor ( ρ )42 0.93 
(0.05) 
Estimates of other parameters Values 
Estimated variance of the Euler Equation  0.08 
Estimated variance of the water equation  0.88 
Estimated variance of the labor equation 1.06 
Estimated variance of the fertilizer equation  0.88 
 
Estimated correlation between water and fertilizer errors 0.02 
 
Estimated correlation between labor and  fertilizer errors 0.33 
 
Estimated correlation between labor and water errors -0.12 
 
Jarque-Bera Test for normality of the errors  (p-value in 
parenthesis) 









Number of observations 32 
Maximum Likelihood  82.5 
 
 
                                                 
42 In the Euler equation I estimate the natural log of the discount factor ( ln ρ ) and I 




In order to check the accuracy of the estimation, I compute Theil’s Inequality 
coefficient over gross output income per hectare43 and water rights investments44.  
That coefficient always falls between 0 and 1. If it takes the value of 0 there is a 
perfect fit in the model; if it takes the value of 1, the predictive performance of the 
model is bad.  Moreover, Theil’s Inequality coefficient can be decomposed in the bias 
(variance) proportion that indicates how far the mean (variance) of the predicted 
values is from the mean (variance) of the actual data (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, 
Chapter 8). For good forecasts, the bias and variance proportions are small.  Because 
gross output income per hectare and water rights investments have been normalized 
by their standard deviation respectively, the comparison between the variance of the 
predicted value and the variance of the actual data is meaningless.  Thus, comparison 
is limited to the bias proportion.  For gross output income per hectare Theil’s 
Inequality coefficient is 74% and the bias proportion is 1.7E-5.  For water rights 
investments Theil’s Inequality coefficient is 76% and the bias proportion is 1.01E-5.  
Those low values of the bias in the means allow me to disregard the possibility of 
systematic bias in the prediction of those variables with my model.  Figures 6.1 and 
6.2 report the actual value of output income per hectare and water right investments 
against the imputed values for those variables, based on the estimates in Table 6.2.   
                                                 
43 On my model the expected value of gross output income per hectare corresponds 








Figure 6.1: Actual value of standardized gross output income per hectare 
against the imputed values for that variable.  

























Figure 6.2: Actual value of standardized investment in water rights 
against the imputed values for that variable 



































Thus, at this time, I can ask whether heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences is a 
valid hypothesis.  That is tested by defining the null hypothesis that the parameters 
,  ,  1 2 3γ γ γ  are jointly zero.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, I infer that farmers 
have heterogeneous preferences.  A maximum likelihood ratio test is used to verify 
the null hypothesis that 01 2 3γ γ γ= = =  against the alternative hypothesis that at 
least one of those parameters is different from zero.  I obtain a value for the 
maximum likelihood ratio test of 112.23 that leads me to strongly reject the null of 
homogeneity on preferences. 
Proper implementation of that test for heterogeneous preferences also requires 
controlling for incomplete markets (Dubois, 2001).  The above specification for iγ  
and equation (4.2.11) make clear that I am testing for differences in the farmers’ 
stochastic discount factors by allowing them to be a function of farmers’ 
characteristics.  Those characteristics enter in the specification of the discount factor 
in equation (4.2.12) through their possible relationship with farmers’ risk aversion.  
Nevertheless, as I discussed on Chapter 4, Section 2, differences in reservation values 
for a water right among farmers in the same water association may also differ due to 
incomplete asset markets.  Because it is well known that farmers in the Limarí Valley 
face incomplete asset markets, testing for the effect of farmers characteristics on the 
stochastic discount factor requires controlling for incomplete asset markets.  One way 
to do this is by allowing consumption to be a function of current income, which is a 
clear consequence of incomplete asset markets.  That approach is used in this 




Estimates for the deterministic component of the production function 
summarized in Table 6.2, show that the three inputs under analysis have a positive 
effect on mean output.  This result is as expected.  In terms of output variance, the 
three inputs have a positive marginal effect on yield variability.  The result that 
fertilizer has a positive marginal effect on production variance corroborates similar 
findings by Love and Buccola (1991) and Just and Pope (1979).  The positive effect 
of labor on yield variability coincides with the result obtained by Di Falco, Chavas 
and Smale (2006) for a sample of farmers from highlands of Ethiopia.   
The finding of water as an increasing risk input is an unexpected result.  
Usually, irrigation is considered as a risk-reducing input.  As an example, irrigation 
reduces the effect of frosts on some type of crops and so their yield variance.  It may 
be possible that the positive sign for water in the stochastic part of the production is 
being caused because crops with higher water requirement are also the ones with 
higher variance.  Then, estimating the effect of water in output risk will require 
controlling for the latter relationship.  That can be done by estimating different 
production functions for each specific crop type.  
The signs of the estimates of the equation for risk aversion indicate that better 
educated farmers and with more experience are less risk-averse.  The result that more 
educated farmers are less risk averse is consistent with the results obtained by Knight 
et al. (2003) with household data from rural Ethiopia.  A possible explication for that 
relationship between risk aversion and education is that more educated farmers are 
better able to manage risk and so they are willing to take more risk.  Nevertheless, 




(2006), which find that higher levels of education are associated with greater risk 
aversion. 
The finding that farmers with higher level of experience exhibit a lower 
degree of risk aversion confirms the result obtained by Z Bar-Shira et al. (1997).  
Those authors explain that result by pointing out that risk is a complicated factor that 
less-experienced farmers try to avoid.   
Regarding the household size it can be hypothesized that the larger the size of 
the family, the higher the subsistence consumption needs and given a fixed amount of 
land, the lower the willingness of the farmer to assume risks.  On the other hand, 
family size might affect the labor capacity of the peasant household in which case a 
larger family size implies greater capacity to assume risks.  Furthermore, larger 
households may diversify their activities and better insure themselves efficiently 
reducing risk.  Thus, those farmers will be lees reluctant to accept a bargain with an 
uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with more certain but possibly lower 
expected payoff.  That makes them less risk-averse or more risk tolerant45.  The result 
that household size does not affect risk aversion suggests the convenience of 
separating those two mentioned effects of that variable over risk aversion by 
including a variable that represents farmer’s diversification and another one for the 
farmer’s number of children in the specification for risk aversion of equation (6.2).  
For the variance of the error term, itΓ , in the linear equation for “other net 
incomes”, Iit , I found that whether or not farmers invest in cattle does not affect the 
                                                 
45 The inverse of a person's risk aversion is sometimes called his risk tolerance 





variance of Iit .  Furthermore, results indicated as it was expected that farmers with 
access to credit for consumption or production have higher variance in Iit .  
Nevertheless, these results are not robust to different specifications of the variance of 
itΓ  neither to variations in the number of observations in the sample. 
The estimated value for the discount factor, ρ =0.93, belongs to the expected 
range for this parameter, 0 < ρ <1.  Nevertheless a value of 0.93 for the discount 
factor seems to be too high to be credible and indicates that the model is not suitable 
for the estimation of that discount factor.  This occurs because I have an identification 
problem with the discount factor: ρ  appears in the Euler Equation as the constant 
term, which is capturing not only the value of the discount factor but also a possible 
non zero mean of the error term as well as other constant terms of that equation.   
Finally, the residuals for each equation based on the estimates in Table 6.2 are 










Euler Water Labor Fertilizer
Figure 6.3: Plot of the residuals from the FIML regression based on estimates in 




Appendix: A Hausman test for endogeneity  
The error term in the Euler Equation (5.1.14), 1 1itυ + , is a composite error:  
1 1 1 1 1it it it jtυ φ ξ ζ≡ + ++ + + + .  Thus for each t+1 period, 1 1itυ +  is the sum of an 
unobserved effect, 1itφ + , and two random errors 1itξ +  and 1jtζ + .  As I discussed in 
Chapter 5, 1itφ +  represents a measure of the volatility of the discounted water right 
prices.  Because that unobserved effect, maximum likelihood estimation of equation 
(5.1.14) may not be consistent due to endogeneity issues.  This would occur if some 
of the exogenous variables in equation (5.1.14) are correlated with 1itφ +  and hence 
with the error term 1 1itυ + .  For example, if water right prices in t+1 were correlated 
with the volatility of the discounted water right price in t+1, the FIML estimate of the 
parameters in the model would be biased due to endogeneity.  A similar situation may 
also arise with respect to input quantities that affect output variance which may affect 
the volatility of the stochastic discount factor.  Thus, the potential presence of 
endogeneity must be tested.   
As in Di Falco, Chavas and Smale (2006) I use a residual-based form of the 
Hausman test that turns to be asymptotically equivalent to the original form of the 
Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002, Chapter 6.2).  The test involves estimating 
auxiliary reduced-form regressions for the regressors suspected to be endogenous.  
Those are linear regressions for each regressor suspected to be endogenous on a 
constant, all the exogenous variables of the model and regressor specific instruments.  
Then the Euler Equation is estimated including the reduced-form residuals as 




associated with the residuals is then evaluated.  If those parameters are jointly not 
significant then the Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of the 
regressors.  As Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 6.2.1) point outs, valid test for the 
individual and the joint significance of those parameters associated with the residuals 
requires an efficient estimation of the Euler Equation. 
This test was implemented for those exogenous variables that are suspected of 
being correlated with the volatility of the discounted water right prices.  Table 6.3 
shows the list of instruments that I use for each possible endogenous regressor.  
Among those instruments I include all the exogenous variables in the system of 
equations that are not correlated with the error term.  Column 1 of that table contains 
the list of variables that were tested to determine if they are statistically correlated 
with the error term 1 1itυ + .   
Table 6.3: List of instruments to test for possible endogenous regressors. 
Possible endogenous 
regressors Instruments 
1 1 1s N vjt it jt∗ ∗+ + +
 
1 1 1s N vjt it jt∗ ∗− − − , ( )1N Nit it−− , Tit , 1Tit+ , Pit , 
1Pit+ , 1s jt+ , s jt , ,  ,  ,  1 1 1 2 2 1r r r rit it it it+ + , v jt , Educ., 
Exp., Household size. 
( )1 1N Njt it itθ −+ +  ( )1 2 1N Njt it itθ −− − − , ( )1N Nit it−− , Tit , 1Tit+ , Pit , 
1Pit+ , 1s jt+ , s jt , ,  ,  ,  1 1 1 2 2 1r r r rit it it it+ + , v jt , Educ., 
Exp., Household size. 
1Lit+  ( )1N Nit it−− , Tit , 1Tit+ , Pit , 1Pit+ , 1s jt+ , s jt , 
,  ,  ,  1 1 1 2 2 1r r r rit it it it+ + , v jt , Educ., Exp., Household size. 
1wit+  ( )1N Nit it−− , Tit , 1Tit+ , Pit , 1Pit+ , 1s jt+ , s jt , 
,  ,  ,  1 1 1 2 2 1r r r rit it it it+ + , v jt , Educ., Exp., Household size. 
1Fit+  ( )1N Nit it−− , Tit , 1Tit+ , Pit , 1Pit+ , 1s jt+ , s jt , 





A maximum likelihood ratio test indicates that the coefficients on the reduced-
form residuals of the equations for the variables in column 1 of the above table were 




Chapter 7: Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
In this dissertation I have shown that heterogeneous risk preferences among 
farmers is a sufficient condition for water rights transfers when farmers can 
simultaneously exchange water in a spot market with lower transaction costs.  To 
reach that goal I developed a model for water right reservation values in which water 
rights are investment assets and where the link between the spot market and market 
for water rights is explicitly considered.  The model encompasses several aspects 
related to water market activity and a farmer’s behavior.  I described and measured 
transaction activity in markets for water rights and in a spot market for water 
volumes, in an existing market since 1981 in the Limarí Basin, Chile.  That analysis 
allowed me to conclude that both markets are reallocating a significant amount of 
water among farmers, although the spot market has, by far, the highest amount of 
traded water.  I also showed that, contrary to what other researchers believe, the spot 
market is active not only during drought years but also in years with average water 
availability.  I characterized optimal decision making by farmers over the number of 
water rights to be held in each season.  The model assumes incomplete asset markets, 
output uncertainty, as well as uncertainty about future water availability and water 
prices. Because investment decisions affect future levels of consumption and farmers 
face uncertainty, the theoretical model for farmer decisions was modeled as a 
stochastic dynamic problem.  This results in a consumption-based capital asset 
pricing model (CCAPM) which is described by an Euler Equation that ties asset 
returns (water right returns in this case) to marginal rates of substitution for 




reservation value of a water right is a function of the current value of the amount of 
water accorded to water rights in the spot market, the expected future water rights 
prices and the stochastic discount factor.  Nevertheless, since most transfers of water 
rights take place among farmers that belong to the same WUA and such farmers are 
likely to have identical expectations, the primary basis for differences in reservation 
values and for water right transactions are the differences in their stochastic discount 
factors.  Incomplete asset markets as well as heterogeneous risk preferences cause 
differences in the stochastic discount factors among farmers. 
Because asset markets are not complete, farmers value water rights not only as 
a source of water for production but also as a means to insure themselves against bad 
shocks.  As a consequence, the future value of a water right is given by the expected 
discounted marginal rate of return to holding a water right from time t to time t+1 
plus a risk premium that is greater than zero.  The latter implies that the reservation 
value of a water right for the more risk-averse farmer is greater than that for the less 
risk-averse farmer.  This produces transfers of water rights from those farmers who 
are least risk averse to the most risk-averse farmers.  This approach also emphasizes 
that water right transactions solve differences in attitudes towards risk among 
farmers, whereas differences in water marginal return among farmers are solved in 
the spot market. 
The theoretical analysis provides the foundation for a case study of water 
transfers for irrigation in the Limarí Basin, an important agricultural region in the 
northern part of Chile, which has one of the most active Chilean irrigation water 




describes farmers’ optimal decisions over the number of water right to be held and 
input quantities.  The estimation of that system assumes that a farmer’s utility from 
consumption is represented by a negative exponential utility function, and that the 
production technology is described by a Just-Pope Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  The use of a negative exponential utility function imposes severe 
restrictions in the model and the results are conditional to that specific functional 
form.  Nevertheless, that utility function allows me to characterize the absolute risk 
aversion coefficient for each farmer as a function of his observable characteristics and 
to develop a promising approach to jointly estimate the parameters that describe 
farmers´ preferences and production technology considering farmers investment 
decisions.  This approach can be extended to more general utility functions although 
that will require more advance methods of estimation.   
The results of the estimation procedure indicate that the hypothesis of 
heterogeneous risk preferences among farmers can not be rejected.  Moreover, better 
educated farmers and with more experience are less risk-averse.  On the production 
side, water, labor and fertilizers have positive impact on output mean per hectare.  
The analysis of inputs on yield variability showed that those inputs are risk 
increasing.   
Up to now, research on agriculture finance has been characterized by the 
dominance of real estate among the farmers’ assets.  But now, due to the increasing 
interest in establishing transferable water rights not married to land rights, research on 
agriculture finance should move from considering land as the main asset to water 




resources, this new challenge offers a significant opportunity for future research.  
That future research may include the analysis of the robustness of the conclusions 
regarding farmers’ heterogeneous risk preferences to alternative functional forms of 
the utility function.  A suitable candidate is a linex utility function (Bell and Fishburn, 
2001), consisting of a utility function that is the sum of an exponential function and a 
linear function.  This function has the important property of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion while retaining some of the convenience of the exponential form.  Moreover, 
that functional form allows a closed form solution to the farmer decision problem that 
I analyze in this dissertation.   
Another possible extension would be to develop alternative ways of dealing 
with the missing data problems that might allow me to use more of the data that I 
have collected among farmers in the Limarí Valley. 
The analysis of the role of risk differences, due to different types of crops or 
distance from the reservoirs, on the reservation values for a water right is another 
interesting extension of this work.  The presence of speculative bubbles in water right 
market prices, as suggested by Person and Michelsen (1994), is an appealing area for 
future applied research on water price models.  Other future research deals with 
improving the mechanism by which prices are formed in the permanent market.  This 
could be done by the design of the right incentives to motivate farmers to reveal their 
private information on the reservation values46.  The existence of this non-disclosed 
private information can reduce the number of transactions even when the reservation 
value of the buyer is greater than that of the seller, and this may impede the efficient 
                                                 
46 Private information in reservation values for water rights includes information 




allocation of water.  The formation of an options market in which farmers may obtain 
options to purchase water during a dry year could be quite useful in addressing this 
problem because an options market reveals the differences in attitude towards risk.  
One of the most interesting problems in the formation of an options market is the 

























 Annex: Survey instrument  
 
Date of Survey _________________Name of interviewee ________________________________ 
 
Association that provides you with water _________________                                                                
 
1. Interviewee’s home (either the tenant’s or the landlord’s) 
 
Information about the tenant or landlord: 
 
1.1 Age ______     Marital Status _______________     
 
1.2 How many people live in your home? ________ 
 
1.3 Please give detailed information about each person living in your home 













 Interviewee yes    
 Wife     
 Son/Daughter     
 Son/Daughter     
 Son/Daughter     
 Son/Daughter     
 
2. Property and management of the land and water  
 





2.2 Please describe your lots? 
Lot N° Location Area No. of water 
shares 
Name of the 
Canal 
     
     
     
     
Total     
 
2.3 Quality and use of the farms 
Lot 
N° 




      
       
       
       
       
Fertility* (1) high fertility (2) low fertility (3) poor quality of land 
Slope* (1) flat (2) hillside (3) hill  
Erosion* (1) no problem  (2) some problem (3) serious problem 
 
2.4. Do you rent either part or all of your property to other persons?  Yes ___   No____ 
Since when/for how long?  _____  
How many hectares? _________      
How much do you charge per year? _________  
With how many water shares? _______  
 
2.5 Do you rent any land properties from other persons?  Yes ____ No______ 
Since when/for how long? ______  
How many hectares? _________      
How much do you pay per year? _________  





2.6 Do you work part or the whole of the land with any partners?  Yes ____ No______. 
How many partners? __________ Are they next of kin (relatives)?  Yes ___ No____ 
How many hectares?_________ Since when/for how long?_________ 
Please describe the type of contract made with your partner(s) (i.e. crops grown, land distribution, water, labor and 
machinery each party supplies, etc.) and how you finance costs and production. ________________________ 
 
2.7 How did you purchase the farm? 
Kind of Purchase Area 
(hectares) 
When did you 
purchase it? 
How much was a 
hectare? 
First purchase    
Second purchase    
Third purchase    
Inherited    
Due to agrarian 
reform 
   
Other    
Total (verify)    
 
2.8 Have you sold or divided your property so far?  Yes___  No___ 
      (If so, please fill in the chart below) 
Type of operation Area 
(Hectares) 
When? How much did 
you ask for each 
hectare? 
First sale    
Second sale    
Third sale    
First partition    
Second partition    
Third partition    
Other    















How much did you 
pay for each water 
share? 
Whom did 
you buy it 
from? 
First buy      
Second buy      
Third buy      
Inherited      
Due to agrarian 
reform 
     
Other      
 
2.10 Have you sold or distributed/divided part of you shares so far? Yes___  No___ 
       (If so, please fill in the chart below) 












you sell it to? 
First sale      
Second sale      
Partitions      
Other      
Total       
 
3 Agricultural Production over the Past Two Seasons 
 
3.1. How much land did you sow in the 98/99 season?_________ 
 3.1.1. How much land did you sow with partners?  _________ 
 
3.2. How much land did you sow in the 97/98 season? _________ 





3.3 What did you sow in the 97/98 and 98/99 seasons? 
Sowing Hectares Were there any 
losses due to 
drought? 
 97/98 98/99 97/98 98/99 
     
     
     
 
3.4 What was your harvest production in the two seasons? 
Crop Total Production Harvested 
Hectares 
Unit of measure 
(sacks, boxes, kilos, 
etc.) 
 97/98 98/99 97/98 98/99 97/98 98/99 
       
       
       
       
       
 
3.5 What were you paid for your products in the two seasons? 
Name of Product Price per unit in 
Pesos $ 
Weight unit 
 97/98 98/99 97/98 98/99 
     
     
     





3.6 What sort of irrigation systems did you use for each crop in the 98/99 season? (Flooding, furrows, drip, etc)  
Crop Irrigated 
area 
Type of irrigation system 
used in the crop 
   
   
   
 
3.7 What sort of irrigation system did you use for each crop in the 97/98 season? (Flooding, furrows, drip, etc)  
Crop Irrigated 
area  
Type of irrigation system 
used in the crop  
   
   
   
   
   
 
3.8 Do you have grapevines?  Yes___   No____ 











       
       
       
       
       





3.9 Do you have any other permanent crops?  Yes____, No_____ 
     (If so, please describe them) 










       
       
       
 
4. Use of Labor and Water 
 
4.1 Do you have permanent workers in your farm?  Yes____ No____ 
 If so, how many? _______ 
 
4.2 How much labor did you use for each crop in the following activities over the past two seasons? 
Grape 1 type) ________________No. hectares_______  No. shrubs________ 
Activity Season 97/98 Season 98/99 
 Time 
span 




Days No. of 
people. 
Salary 
Pruning/tying         
Applications         
Watering         
Clearing         
Harvest         





Grape 2 type) _____________No. hectares_______ No. shrubs___________ 
Activity Season 97/98 Season 98/99 
 Time 
span 





Days No. of 
people. 
Salary 
Pruning/tying         
Applications         
Watering         
Clearing         
Harvest         
Other         
 
Crop No. 1_________________ 
Activity Season 97/98 Season 98/99 
 Time span Days No. of people. Salary Time span Days No. of people. Salary 
Preparation of the land         
Seedbed          
Transplant         
Seed Sowing         
Applications         
Watering/irrigation         
Clearing         
Harvest         







Crop N° 2_________________ 
Activity Season 97/98 Season 98/99 
 Time span Days No. of people. Salary Time span Days No. of people. Salary 
Preparation of the land         
Seedbed          
Transplant         
Seed Sowing         
Applications         
Watering/irrigation         
Clearing         
Harvest         
Other         
 
Crop N° 3________________ 
Activity Season 97/98 Season 98/99 
 Time span Days No. of 
people. 
Salary Time span Days No. of people. Salary 
Preparation of the land         
Seedbed          
Transplant         
Seed Sowing         
Applications         
Watering/irrigation         
Clearing         
Harvest         






4.3 Did you and your family take part in the pruning?  Yes___ No____ 
 
4.4 Did you and your family take part in the sowings?  Yes ___ No____ 
 
4.5 Did you and your family take part in the harvest?  Yes ___ No____ 
 
4.6 Did your permanent workers take part in the pruning?  Yes___ No____ 
 
4.7 Did your permanent workers take part in the sowings?  Yes ___ No___ 
 
4.8 Did your permanent workers take part in the harvest?  Yes ___ No___ 
 





5 Use of Inputs and Other Expenses   
 
5.1 Please state the amount/number and cost of inputs in the agricultural production in the last two seasons.  
 
Grape Harvest 1_____________ hectares______ N° shrubs________ 
Input Amount. 
97/98 
Unit Total cost Amount 
98/99 
Unit Total cost 
Fertilizers       
       
       
       
Pesticide/insecticide/fungicide       
       
       
Pumping  M/hr or days     
       
Freight       
 









Fertilizers       
       
       
       
Pesticide/insecticide/fungicide       
       
       
Pumping  M/hr or     
       
Freight       







Crop 1_____________ hectares______ 
Input Amount 
97/98 
Unit Total cost Amount 
98/99 
Unit Total cost 
Seeds       
Fertilizers       
       
       
Pesticide/insecticide/fungicide       
       
       
Pumping  M/hr or days     
       





Unit Total cost Amount 
98/99 
Unit Total cost 
Seeds       
Fertilizers       
       
       
Pesticide/insecticide/fungicide       
       
       
Pumping  M/hr or days     
       





5.2 Did you rent in a tractor in the last two seasons?  Yes ___ No ___ 
If so, answer the questions below 
 
Grape Harvest 
           97/98              98/99    
    M/Hr     Price M/Hr     Price 
Preparation of land  ______   ______ _____    _____ 
Application    ______   ______ _____    _____ 
Crop    ______   ______ _____    _____ 
 
Other Harvests 
            97/98             98/99    
    M/Hr     Price M/Hr     Price 
Preparation of land  ______   ______ _____    _____ 
Application    ______   ______ _____    _____ 
Crop    ______   ______ _____    _____ 
 
If not, please answer 
Did you use your own tractor?  Yes ____   No _____ 
 
5.3 How did you use your own tractor (or tractors) in your own land in the last to seasons? 
 
Grape Harvest 
     97/98    98/99    
    M/Hr      M/Hr      
Preparation of land  ______    _____     
Application    ______   _____     






     97/98   98/99    
    M/Hr      M/Hr      
Preparation of land  ______            _____     
Application    ______            _____     
Crop    ______    _____     
 
5.4 Did you rent your tractor(s) to other farmers?  Yes___ No____ 
If so, for how many hours _______  At what price? _______ 
 
5.5 Did you hire an accountant in the last two seasons?  Yes_____, No_____ 
If so, how much did you pay him/her ______________ 
 
5.6 Did you buy water in the last two seasons?  Yes ____ No _____ 
If so, please answer: 
 
Amount purchased 97/98 _________ Price _______ ($ per m3) 
Date of purchase __________    
Name and address of salesman__________ 
How many salesmen did you deal with? __________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the purchase? ___________ 
How did you contact the salesman? _________________ 
Why did you buy? _____________ 
 
Amount purchased 98/99 _________ Price _______ ($ per m3) 
Date of purchase __________    
Name and address of salesman __________ 
How many salesmen did you deal with? _____________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the purchase? ___________ 
How did you contact the salesman? _________________ 





5.7 Did you sell water in the last two seasons?  Yes ____ No _____ 
If so, please answer: 
 
Amount sold 97/98 _________  Price _______ ($ per m3)   
Date of sale __________    
Name and address of buyer __________ 
How many buyers did you deal with? _____________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the sale? ___________ 
How did you contact the buyer?_______________ 
Why did you sell?_____________ 
 
Amount sold 98/99 _________  Price _______ ($ per m3)   
Date of sale __________    
Name and address of buyer __________ 
How many buyers did you deal with? _____________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the sale? ___________ 
How did you contact the buyer? _______________ 
Why did you sell? _____________ 
 
5.8 Did you buy water shares in the last two seasons?  Yes ____ No _____ 
If so, please answer the questions below 
 
No. of shares bought 97/98 _________Price _______ ($ per share) 
Date of purchase __________    
Name and address of salesman __________ 
How many salesmen did you deal with?______________________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the purchase? ___________ 
How did you contact the salesman? _________________ 
How much time passed since you decided to buy shares until you got hold of them? 





No. of shares bought 98/99 _________ Price _______ ($ per share) 
Date of purchase __________    
Name and address of salesman __________ 
How many salesmen did you deal with? ______________________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the purchase? ___________ 
How did you contact the salesman? _________________ 
How much time passed since you decided to buy shares until you got hold of them? ___________ 
Why did you buy? _________________ 
 
5.9 Did you sell water shares in the last two seasons?  Yes ____ No ________  
 
No. Of shares sold in 97/98 _________Price _______ ($ per share) 
Date of sale __________    
Name and address of buyer __________ 
How many buyers did you deal with? _____________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the sale? ___________ 
How did you contact the buyer? _______________ 
How much time passed since you decided to sell your shares until you transferred them?______________ 
Why did you sell? _____________ 
 
No. Of shares sold in 98/99 _________ Price _______ ($ per share) 
Date of sale __________    
Name and address of buyer __________ 
How many buyers did you deal with? _____________ 
Did you use a middleman to negotiate the sale? ___________ 
How did you contact the buyer? _______________ 
How much time passed since you decided to sell your shares until you transferred them? ______________ 
Why did you sell? _____________ 
 
5.10 Did you rent in water shares in the last two seasons?  Yes ____ No _____ 
If so, please answer the questions below 
 




Date of leasing __________ 
Duration of the leasing contract___________    
Name and address of the renter__________ 
How many people did you negotiate the leasing with? __________ 
Did you use any middlemen to negotiate the leasing? __________ 
How did you contact the renter _________________ 
Why did you rent in water shares? _____________ 
 
Number of water shares leased in 98/99 _________Price _______ ($ per share) 
Date of leasing __________ 
Duration of the leasing contract___________    
Name and address of the renter__________ 
How many people did you negotiate the leasing with? __________ 
Did you use any middlemen to negotiate the leasing? __________ 
How did you contact the renter _________________ 
Why did you rent in water shares? _____________ 
 
5.11 Did you rent out water shares in the last two seasons?  Yes ____ No _____ 
If so, please answer these questions below 
 
Number of water shares leased in 97/98 _________ Price _______ ($ per share) 
Date of leasing__________ 
Duration of the leasing contract___________    
Name and address of the lessee__________ 
How many people did you negotiate the leasing with? __________ 
Did you use any middlemen to negotiate the leasing? __________ 
How did you contact the lessee__________? 
Why did you leasing water shares? _________________ 
 
Number of water shares leased in 98/99_________ Price _______ ($ per share) 
Date of leasing__________ 
Duration of the leasing contract___________    




How many people did you negotiate the leasing with? __________ 
Did you use any middlemen to negotiate the leasing? __________ 
How did you contact the lessee__________? 
Why did you rent out water shares? 
 
6. Husbandry production in the last two seasons 
 
6.1 Do you have livestock?  Yes ____ , No_____ (If not, skip to the next section, if so, please describe your current stock 
of cattle) 
Kind Number Breed Approx. Total value 
in Pesos $ 
    
    
    
    
 





6.2 Have you sold livestock in the last two years?  Yes ___, No____ 
 (If so, please describe your sales) 
Sales Units When? Price per unit 
1st sale    
2nd sale    
3rd sale    
    




6.3 Have you bought livestock in the last two years?  Yes ___, No____ 
 (If so, please describe your purchases) 
Buys Units When? Price per unit 
1st buy    
2nd buy    
3rd buy    
    
    
 
6.4 Dou you produce milk or cheese for sale?  Yes ____, No_____ 
(If so, what was your average productivity per animal over the last three years?)  
Productivity in 1999 _____________ Price of milk in 1999 __________ 
Productivity in 1998 _____________ Price of milk in 1998 __________ 
Productivity in 1997 _____________ Price of milk in 1997 __________ 
 
6.5 What are the main expenses (in pesos) per animal monthly or yearly for the husbandry production of your farm? 
 
               Expense per animal     Monthly or Yearly  
 Feeding costs    _____________  ________ 
 Healthcare costs   _____________  ________ 
 Labor     _____________  ________ 
 Other expenses  _____________  ________ 
 
6.6 Have you lost animals because of drought?  Yes ___, No____ 
      How many? ___ 






7. Productive tools 
 
7.1 What equipment of your own do you have for the agricultural production of your farm? 
Type of equipment   
 Units Years Old Equipment description 
Tractors    
Animals for labor    
Fumigation and application    
Equipment of the harvest    
Production Transportation    
Other equipment    
 
7.2 Do you have wells and pumping equipment?  Yes ____ No _____(if so, what are their characteristics ?) 







      
      
      
      
 
7.3 How many hours have you used your pump (or pumps) to drain water from your well during each season? 
 97/98 __________ (Hours) 98/99 ___________ (Hours) 
 
7.4 Do you have any storing system for surface water? (docks, tanks, etc.)?   
Yes____ No _____ Type _______________ 
Age ___________.Covered area (m2) ________  





7.5 Do you have mechanized irrigation in your farm?  Yes ____  No____ 
 If so, please fill in the chart below 
Irrigation 
Implements 
Years Detailed description 
   
   
   
   
 
7.6 Do you have a contract with an export company or are you a member of a Pisco association?  Yes ____, No ____ 
If so, please describe the contract:  
 
 7.6.1 Name of the company   ____________________ 
  
7.6.2 Length of contract to date ____________________ 
  
7.6.3 Type of payment (monthly, bi-monthly, etc) _____________ 
  
7.7 Does the company provide you with one of these services? 
 
7.7.1 Technical support (describe) _____________________________________________  
 
7.7.2 Credit assistance (describe) _______________________________________________ 
 
7.7.3 Commercialization (describe) _____________________________________________ 
 
7.8 Did you purchase harvest insurance in the 97/98 season? 
 Whom did you purchase it from? ___________________ How much did you pay for it? _________________ 
 
7.9 Did you hire purchase harvest insurance in the 98/99 season? 







8 Participation in Lending Markets and Subsidies  
 
8.1 Have you applied for any production loans in the last two seasons?   
Yes ___ No____ (If not, skip to question 8.3) 
 
8.2 Have you received any production loans in the last two seasons?   
Yes ____No___ (If so, please fill in the following chart) 
Source of the loan Loan amount in Pesos $ Interest rate Time span 
 97/98 98/99 97/98 98/99 97/98 98/99 
Commercial Bank       
INDAP       
Other sources       
 
8.3 Have you applied to be granted a bonus or subsidy bonus to improve the irrigation system in your farm?   
 Yes ____ No_____ (If not, go to question 8.5)   
 
8.4 Have you obtained any bonus from the government?  Yes ___ No ____ (If not, go to question 8.5) 
Did you already use the bonus?  Yes ____ No____ 
 
Have you received or do you plan to receive any bank loans to complement the bonus or subsidy bonus?  Yes ___ No____ 
 
What type of bonus did you apply for?  For entrepreneurs ____, for farmers ____ both _____ 
 
Account for the money received in bonus or subsidy bonus ______ (Pesos) 
 
8.5 If you have not applied for a bonus from the government, why is it so? 
____________________________________________________________   
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